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Summary  findings
This cross-country evaluation of institutional responses  transfers and decentralize water development and
to problems in the water sector shows that changes in the  distribution systems takes practical shape. Tentative
nature of water problems have changed the development  conclusions reached by Saleth and Dinar:
paradigm underlying water institutions. There is  - Attempts to fix isolated parts of the water sector will
increasing recognition of how decentralized allocation  influence other dimensions but an integrated approach is
mechanisms can influence economic forces and  best. At the heart of such an approach should be
stakeholders in water sector decisions. As the notion of  institutional changes aimed at modernizing and
water provision as a public good and welfare activity  strengthening legal, policy, and administrative
gives way to the concept of water as an economic good  arrangements for the whole sector.
and an input of economic activity, there is more policy  - Institutional  changes taking place everywhere
concern about efficient and equitable use, cost recovery,  suggest that the opportunity costs of (and net gain from)
and financial viability.  institutional change are overtaking most transaction
All of the countries Saleth and Dinar studied  costs. But institutional change is not uniform, suggesting
(Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Israel, Mexico,  that opportunity  and transaction costs vary.
Morocco, South Africa, Spain, and Sri Lanka) are  - Funding agencies should focus efforts and resources
committed to changing the policies and institutions that  in countries, areas, and subsectors that already have
have caused the present water sector crisis, but they are  enough critical mass in institution-building to ensure
at different stages of institutional reform. Among cases  success and lower transaction costs.
discussed, Australia and Chile (and, in the United States,  - The sequence and pace of reform should reflect
California and Colorado) are at an advanced (though not  realities of scale economies and political pressures from
ideal) stage of institutional change. Israel, with its  reform constituencies. When possible, political economy
technologically advanced water sector, could well be  should be exploited to move reform along more quickly.
ahead of them when the proposal to allow water
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.i.EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
Water institutions, i.e., fornal  as well as informal water law, water policy, and water ad-
ministration, are undergoing remarkable changes worldwide.  Despite country-specific
variations,  the  institutional  changes observed  at the  international level  evince  certain
common trends and patterns.  This study aims to unravel these trends and patterns by ad-
dressing the following questions.  Which are the key factors that motivate these institu-
tional  changes?  What are their nature and direction?  What effects can they have on
overall water sector performance?  And, finally but more importantly, is it possible to use
cross-country  experience for deriving  an  international agenda for encouraging  institu-
tional change within the water sector?
While country-specific descriptive studies dealing with either water institutions or
water sector performance in isolation are common, studies evaluating the institutional
underpinnings of water sector performance with  a cross-country perspective are rather
rare.  With globalization and an increasing integration of the world economic system,
countries  have begun  to realize that  learning from mutual  experience is an  important
means for improving their mutual performance in various spheres including water man-
agement.  Documentation  and analytical evaluation of cross-country experience in the
realm of water institutions can facilitate cross-country flow of policy information enable
international funding agencies to frame national/global initiatives to improve and sustain
water sector performance through institutional reforms.  It is this fact that provides the
motivation and justification for this study.
As to the approach and evaluation context, this  study relies on a combination of
field-based  appraisal technique and judgmental  perception of water sector experts ob-
tained through a survey instrument.  The countries selected for a comparative evaluation
of water institutions are: Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Spain, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Australia, China, and India.  Since the sample covers different continents, histori-
cal backgrounds, political systems, development stages, demographic trends,  water law
traditions, and, more importantly, water scarcity levels, it can represent well the reality of
global water institutions in all their relevant dimensions.  Since water institution falls in a
domain intersected by economics, law, and public policy and is strongly influenced by re-
source endowment, demography, and science and technology, the basic approach here is
inherently inter-disciplinary in orientation and analytical in character.
The preliminary evaluation of water sector across sample countries shows that the
key issue is no longer resource development and water quantity but resource allocation
and water quality.  The notion of water provision as a public good and welfare activity
has giving place to the concept of water as an economic good and input in economic ac-
tivity.  The old development paradigm centered on centralized decision-making, admin-
istrative regulation, and bureaucratic allocation is fading fast to pave the way for a new
paradigm rooted in decentralized allocation, economic instruments, and stakeholder par-
iiiticipation.  Some of the tentative conclusions and implications emanating from this study
are:
(1) As to the overall thrust  of water sector reform strategy, the intimate multi-
dimensional linkages among key water sector problems suggest two crucial policy tips.
First, although isolated attempts in one dimension of the water problem will certainly in-
fluence other dimensions as well, an integrated approach will have the maximum effects
through the phenomenon of inter-dimensional synergy.  And, second, at the heart of such
an integrated approach lie institutional changes that aim to modernize and strengthen the
legal, policy, and administrative arrangements governing water sector as a whole.
(2) The occurrence of actual institutional changes across almost all countries can
be taken as an indirect and informal observational evidence for the fact that the opportu-
nity costs (i.e., the potential net gain) of institutional change are increasing to surpass the
corresponding transaction costs in most contexts.  But, the fact that institutional changes
are uniform neither across institutional components nor across water sub-sectors suggests
that both the opportunity and transaction costs do vary by context.
(3) From the viewpoint of international funding agencies, the main planks of their
strategy in the institutional  arena of their borrowing countries, i.e., the formulation of
water policy and water law, and the reorganization of water administration, should con-
tinue.  But, to gain tactical advantage and maximize the return on their institutional in-
vestments, the funding agencies need to concentrate their efforts and resources in coun-
tries, areas, and sub-sectors already with a critical mass of institutional building that as-
sures lower transaction costs and a greater probability for success.
(4) In view of the positive effects of scale economies and political pressures for
further change from reform constituencies, transaction costs decline and political balance
improves as one moves along the institutional change continuum.  This means that it is
prudent from a political economy perspective to proceed on a logically linked, prioritized,
and  sequentially designed scheme of reforms where water sub-sectors and institutional
components are taken one at a time.
(5) And, finally, since both the transaction and opportunity costs of institutional
change are influenced by forces both external and internal to water sector, it is important
to fully exploit the political economy context provided by these factors for gaining mo-
mentum to promote institutional changes at a faster rate.
ivWATER CHALLENGE AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE-
A CROSS-COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
Institutional arrangements governing water sector are undergoing remarkable changes in
recent years.  Although both the nature and direction of these institutional changes vary
by country-specific economic, political, and resource realities, there are clearly identifi-
able trends and patterns.  To unravel these trends and patterns of change at the interna-
tional level, it is necessary to address the following questions.  Which are the key factors
that motivate  these institutional changes?  What are the nature  and direction of these
changes?  How adequate are these changes for addressing both the existing and emerging
water sector challenges?  What do they ultimately mean for overall water sector perform-
ance?  Is it possible to use cross-country experience for deriving a workable agenda for
institutional changes especially in countries that are at the threshold of water sector re-
form?  The answers to these and related questions help in understanding the water sector
challenges and in delineating the contours of ongoing institutional responses.
With an increasing integration of world economic system under the ongoing proc-
ess of globalization, countries have begun to realize that learning from each other's expe-
rience is an important means for improving their mutual performance in various spheres
including water management.  While country-specific studies dealing with  either water
institutions  or water sector performance in isolation are common, studies evaluating the
institutional underpinnings of water sector performance with a cross-country perspective
are rather rare.  Although country-specific approaches are useful, the "best practice" cases
identified through a cross-country exercise is particularly more relevant for promoting in-
stitutional changes.  Documentation and analytical evaluation of cross-country experience
in the context of water sector and its institutional arrangements are valuable, at least, on
two counts.  While cross-country experience provides countries with the option of learn-
ing/adapting from each others'  experience with minimal cost of experimenting new in-
stitutions under uncertainty, it also enables international funding agencies in developing a
basis  for both  framing and perfecting national and  global initiatives to  improve water
sector performance and sustainability.  It is this current relevance and policy significance
that motivate and justify the present study aiming at a cross-country evaluation of recent
institutional responses to water sector challenges.
EVALUATION CONTEXT
The value and  credibility  of cross-country approach  as a tool  of analysis is critically
predicated  on the choice of sample countries selected for field-based first-hand evalua-
tion.  The sample needs to be large enough to capture variations in socio-economic con-ditions, political settings, and water sector realities but small enough to permit a rapid
field-based  appraisal  of major water sector challenges  and key institutional  responses  ob-
served  at the international  level. After  a process  of careful  screening,  the countries  finally
selected to form the sample for cross-country  comparison  are: Mexico, Chile, Brazil,
Spain, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Australia,  China, and India.  Since the
sample covers different continents,  historical backgrounds,  political systems, develop-
ment stages, demographic  trends, water law traditions,  and, more importantly,  levels of
water scarcity, it can represent  well the reality of global water sector in all its relevant
dimensions. The representative  character  of the sample is enhanced  further by the fact
that it also covers the full spectrum  of recently observed  institutional  changes and water
sector  reforms  in terms of their coverage  and effectiveness.
Of the 11 sample  countries,  all, but India, were visited during October-December
1997. In each country, 4 to 5 days were spent mainly for meeting and discussing  with
key water sector experts  (see Appendix-A  for the list of experts  interacted)  as well as for
collecting  recent materials  on water sector and water institutions. Considering  this list of
experts--with differential experience and disciplinary  orientation--as  a sample, a pre-
designed questionnaire  was administered  so as to gather  both factual  and judgmental in-
formation  on various aspects  of water institutions  and water sector  performance. This in-
formation  forms the basis for a quantitative  evaluation  of issues operating  in the interface
between water institutions and water sector performance  that is reported in Saleth and
Dinar (1998). But, the information,  which is derived from personal interactions  with a
cross-section  of water experts and a partial review of recent materials  gathered during
field visits, remains  the basis for the analysis  reported  here.
Since water institution  falls in a domain  intersected  by economics,  law, and public
policy and is also strongly  influenced  by factors  like resource endowment,  demography,
and science and technology,  the basic approach here is inherently inter-disciplinary  in
orientation  and analytical  in character. The focus of comparison  will be on major water
sector problems  and recent  institutional  responses  of each of the sample  countries. While
water sector covers all its sub-sectors,  the institutional  change covers changes in water
law, water policy, and water administration. Although  the comparison  confines almost
exclusively  to the 11 sample countries,  the experience  from other countries and regions
will be brought  to reinforce  some  points in few relevant  contexts.
As to the structure  of this paper, after a general discussion on the linkages be-
tween water challenge  and institutional  change, a quick review  of country-specific  situa-
tion is attempted  with a focus on key physical and institutional  features of water sector,
its key challenges,  and recent/proposed  institutional  responses.  This is followed first by
the identification  of best practices  and then by the delineation  of certain  common trends
and tendencies observed in water sector problems and institutional arrangements. Fi-
nally, the paper concludes  by indicating  the major implications  for Bank's policy and op-
eration,  particularly  in framing  both country-specific  and general strategies  to encourage
institutional changes conducive for market-based  allocation and sustainable water re-
source  management.
2WATER  SECTOR  PROBLEMS AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
Available documentation of water sector problems--both at the national and global levels-
-does not present a rosy picture overall.  Water resource development either has reached
or is fast approaching the limit of ultimate utilizable potential in most countries.  Even in
areas with undeveloped  water resource potential, further resource development is con-
strained by environmental concerns, technical inadequacy, and budgetary limits.  Mean-
while, the demand for water is on an ever-increasing spree due to the formidable effects
of population expansion, economic development, and life-style changes. The main result
of a growing demand-supply gap is the intensification of inter-sectoral and inter-regional
water conflicts.  The growth in urban water demand has both quantitative and qualitative
dimensions.  Ironically, the quality dimension is subject to the contradictory influence of
two opposing effects.  On the one hand, since urban groups have higher living standards
and greater political articulation, every increase in urban water quantity is likely to be ac-
companied by a higher demand for better water quality.  On the other hand,  since the
growth in urban water demand means more residential sewerage and industrial pollution,
every increase  in urban  water consumption, if not  addressed properly, could lead to a
concurrent deterioration in water quality.  The unfavorable effects of water scarcity--both
absolute and relative--are magnified further by rapid deterioration in water quality that
discounts the utility of an already inadequate water supply.
Although, the scarcity value of water is increasing, the politically-rooted system
of public provision and subsidized water charges insulate the water economy from the in-
fluence of actual market forces.  Low water charges and poor recovery rates risk the effi-
cient maintenance of existing water infrastructure as well as the additional investments on
future water development projects.  Declining water sector investment and deteriorating
physical health of water infrastructure have raised questions about the unfavorable effects
on the quality and sustainability of water services.  The growing recognition of the close
linkages among financial status, physical health, and service quality in the water sector
remains the motive force to prompt reforms in water pricing and cost recovery policies in
most countries (see Dinar and Subramanian, 1997).  While the water sector is gradually,
but steadily, emerging out of the grip of political and other myopic considerations, it has
not yet reached the stage where economic and sustainability considerations can have a
dominant role in guiding water sector decisions.
The crisis in the water sector has also made apparent the inherent limitations of
the existing institutions in dealing effectively with the new set of problems that are not
related to resource development but to resource allocation and management.  Allocation
and  conflict resolution  mechanisms have to  be  either  created or  strengthened/updated
both in the legal and policy spheres.  Water users, who were customers or clients in the
surplus era of water development, have now become important players in the scarcity era
of water sector.  The water administration and water sector decision process have to  ac-
commodate now  an increasing role of user organizations, non-governmental  agencies,
and women, environmental, and other self-help groups as well as to explore the ways in
which emerging water and information technologies can be gainfully utilized.  In short, as
3countries move from a state of plenty to a state of scarcity, water institutions, that define
the rules of water development, allocation, and utilization, have to be concurrently reori-
ented to reflect the changing supply-demand and quantity-quality realities.
Institutional reorientation involving fundamental changes in the three interrelated
dimensions of water institutions, i.e., water law, water policy, and water administration,
though crucial, is not an easy task.  The main issue here is what explains. these institu-
tional changes and how these changes are interrelated.  One of the key premises in insti-
tutional economics literature is that institutional change occurs only when its transaction
costs are less than the corresponding opportunity costs.  In the particular context of water
institutions,  transaction costs cover both the real and monetary  costs of instituting the
regulatory,  monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms needed for water resource devel-
opment, allocation, and management.  Similarly, the opportunity costs cover both the real
and economic value of opportunities foregone or the net social loss due to  'status  quo'.
With increasing water scarcity, the opportunity costs of status quo are indeed tremendous
and increasing fast to exceed the corresponding transaction costs.
The theoretical literature  elaborating the additional gains possible  from institu-
tional changes--both in the general and in the water sector contexts--are vast and growing.
While the literature in a general institutional context covers the seminal works of Olson
(1971), Bromley (1989), and North (1990), that in the water institution context covers the
important works by Frederikson (1992), Le Moigne, et al., (1994), and Picciotto (1995).
Apart from this theoretical literature on the gains from institutional change, there are also
few recent  studies which try to  quantify the potential gain from changes in  a particular
segment of water institutions like water markets, inter-regional transfers, and water qual-
ity institutions  (e.g., Vaux and Howitt,  1984; Dinar and Latey,  1991; Zilberman, et al.,
1998; Howitt, 1994; and Heme and Easter, 1997). There are also few studies which pro-
vide some rough numerical estimates for the opportunity cost (i.e., the potential social
gain) of change in water institution as a whole for countries like Chile (Gazmuri and Ro-
segrant, 1994:24) and India (Saleth, 1996:274).  In both cases, the calculation involves
first an estimation of actual or potential efficiency-induced additional irrigated area and
then the estimation of the cost of creating that area by new construction.  The estimated
opportunity costs vary from $ 400 million for Chile to $ 14 billion for India.  Similar, but
simulation-based, estimates for the context of San Joaquin valley place the opportunity
cost to be $ 223 million (Archibald and Renwick, 1998).  As distinct from the approach
of trying to estimate the opportunity costs of institutional change, there are also attempts
which tries to directly estimate the transaction costs of reform (e.g., Colby, 1990; Easter,
1998).
The present approaches towards estimating both the opportunity and transactions
costs of institutional  change in the water sector remain admittedly partial.  For, they do
not  adequately  account either  for the  segment-specific institutional  needs  of  different
water sub-sectors or for the component-specific cost variations  across various  compo-
nents of water institution (i.e., water law, water policy, and water administration).  Varia-
tions in the opportunity and transactions costs across water sub-sectors and water institu-
tion components make institutional changes easier in some contexts but difficult in other
4contexts.  For example, it is easier to formulate and declare a water policy than to design
and promulgate a water law.  Similarly, it is much easier to have both water policy and
water law than to create new or reform existing administrative structures needed for an
effective field level translation of legal provisions.  Since institutional change is a contin-
uum, the easier reforms initiated in the early stages brightens the prospects of further and
higher level institutional changes.  This means that there is an intricate and functional
linkage between the transaction costs of subsequent reforms and the opportunity costs of
earlier reforms.  Although  these linkages appear to be  highly abstract and theoretical,
their practical influence within the political economy of reform process should neither be
ignored nor be underestimated.
Since the magnitude of net benefits from institutional changes in water sector is a
direct function of the degree of water scarcity, the economic incentives for institutional
change increases with every increase in the level of water scarcity as induced by factors
like population  growth, economic development, and climate  change.  Increasing water
scarcity also magnifies the real and economic costs of inappropriate water sector policies
(e.g., treating water as an 'open  access' resource and subsidized water provision) which
can be approximated by the gap between the scarcity value of water and the prevailing
water charges.  Besides,  the opportunity cost  of institutional  change within the water
sector is also strongly influenced by some factors that originate outside the strict confimes
of the water sector.  These factors, which are often underestimated, include the macro
economic  adjustment policies  and  socio-political liberalization and reconstruction pro-
grams.  Macro economic reform magnifies the fiscal implications of the opportunity costs
of institutional  change.  In contrast, the socio-political reform attempts (e.g., in  Chile
during the 1970s, Spain during the 1980s, China since the 1980s, and South Africa since
the 1990s) reduces the transaction costs directly because the institutional changes in water
sector form part of a system-wide reform.  The opportunity cost of institutional change is
also  being  magnified further by  water-related natural  catastrophes  such  like droughts
(e.g., California), floods (e.g., China), and soil salinity (e.g., Australia).  This means that
the original opportunity costs of a crisis-ridden water sector, though remain a potent force
for change, need, however, additional supports and contexts to get the much needed po-
litical economy thrust to prompt and sustain the process of institutional change.
WATER SECTOR AND INSTITUTIONAL  CHANGE: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC Focus
Water sector crisis is linked to institutional changes through a chain of economic, politi-
cal, and natural factors both within and outside the water sector.  Current knowledge does
enable  the tracing  of this causative chain of change including its nature and direction.
But, current information can allow neither a precise quantification of the true transaction
and opportunity costs of institutional change nor a rigorous evaluation of the extent in-
stitutional inter-linkages can be exploited to promote water institutional changes with the
least transactions  cost.  However, the occurrence of institutional  changes in almost  all
countries does suggest the presence or the emergence of the necessary conditions for in-
stitutional change.  To see this, it is necessary to study the nature of both the water chal-
lenges and recent institutional changes in each of the 11 sample countries.
5Mexico
Mexico covers an area of about 2 million square kilometers (sqkm) with most of its teri-
tory  (2/3) being arid or semi-arid.  It has and a population of about 98 million people.
Rainfall varies widely from  150 millimeter (mm) in the deserts in north west regions to
over 1,700 mm in the humid tropics in the south.  The a mean annual precipitation is 780
mm.  The total renewable water resource potential from rainfall is estimated.  at 441 billion
cubic meter (bcum)--410 bcum from surface and 31 bcum from sub-surface sources [see
Commission Nacional  del Agua (CNA), 1990:4].  The actual water extraction is about
185 bcum of which agriculture accounts for over 80 percent leaving the rest for domestic
and industrial uses.  The non-consumptive use of hydro-power generation uses 60 percent
of the total surface water withdrawn.  Although agriculture accounts for 66 percent of the
total groundwater use, it is groundwater that supports 70 percent of domestic and indus-
trial water needs (Simas,  1997).  The water use in Mexico is, therefore, centered essen-
tially around its irrigation segment.
Mexico has a strong centralized government and water resource management  is-
sues are with the central government.  Prompted by the macro-economic crisis of the late
1980s, Mexico has undertaken unprecedented reforms beginning first with the irrigation
sector in  1988 and gradually covering water sector as a whole.  The irrigation sector re-
form has taken the form of massive transfer of public irrigation systems to user groups
(see Trava,  1994; Gorriz, et al.  1995; Johnson,  1996 and  1997).  By  1996, 2.9 million
hectares (mha)--representing 87 percent of the area under major and medium  irrigation
and 46 percent of the total area under all irrigation--have been transferred to 386 Water
User Associations (WUAs). This irrigation management transfer (IMT) has led to a dra-
matic improvement in cost recovery, system maintenance, and staff reduction as well as
some notable improvements in yield and water use efficiency (see Johnson, 1996; Pala-
cios, 1997). There were also significant changes in the legal sphere with the enactment of
the National Water Law in 1992 and the Federal Law of Regulations in Water Matters in
1994.  Similar changes can also seen in the policy arena with the government's  desire to
decentralize urban water supply and encourage private investment in water sector.  De-
spite these positive developments, the Mexican water sector still faces the following key
challenges.
Addressing the second-generation problems of IMT (e.g., organizational issues and
water conflicts among WUAs as well as between WUAs and municipalities;
*  Strengthening  the institutional linkages between WUAs  and  government agencies
providing farm inputs, farm and water technologies, and extension services;
*  Deepening and extending water sector reform to cover groundwater as well as urban
and industrial uses;
Developing institutions for inter-sectoral/regional water allocation (i.e., basin level
entities) including  an  effective usage  of National  Registry of Water  Users  as the
technical and information base for water allocation at various levels;
*  Creating  both  the  macro  and  micro  level  institutional  structures  for  arresting
groundwater depletion and water quality deterioration; and
6*  Promoting private sector participation in irrigation investment and technology trans-
fer.
Recent policy changes have both positive and negative implications for these wa-
ter sector challenges.  With a reduced role in the irrigation sector and passage of the pri-
vate-oriented water law, the government can take an active role in the critical areas of
regulation, monitoring,  and enforcement.  For accomplishing such a role, in  1995 the
CNA moved to the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources,  and Fishing.  But,
with reduced staff and budget, the CNA is in a position neither to play the regulatory
function effectively nor to dovetail WUAs within the existing structure of agriculture and
water-related institutions.  The new water law allows private and transferable use rights
but limits such transfers only within the sector as water transfers involving a change of
use need prior approval.  From the viewpoint of water sector decentralization and privati-
zation, there are, at least, four positive developments.
*  The initiatives for moving water supply functions to state and municipal governments
and also for creating financially self-dependent utility-type systems for that purpose;
*  With the success of Llerma Basin Council (1989) that  solved the most  contentious
inter-state water conflicts in Mexico, basin level organization as an instruments for
stakeholder participation and negotiated settlement is also being extended for experi-
ment in the Rio Bravo (1994) and the Valley of Mexico (1996) basins;
- The New Agrarian Act has recently relaxed the land-ceiling for irrigated land from 20
to 100 ha to provide incentives for private investment in irrigation; and
3  The current efforts to separate the broad issue of water resource management  from
narrow sectoral biases and make, thereby, a clear distinction between water as a re-
source and water as an usufruct.
While institutional changes in Mexico are remarkable, still they are not adequate
enough to address the key water sector challenges facing the country.  Fortunately, Mex-
ico has now a strong enough institutional foundation to build a comprehensive framework
for effectively addressing both water quantity and quality problems across all water sub-
sectors and uses.  Since the solution lies not in the mere creation of sophisticated institu-
tions  but in their effectiveness as enforcement organs, the focus should be on both  the
hardware (e.g., organizations, and water storage and distribution networks) and software
(e.g., law, policies, and capacity building) aspects of water institutions.
Chile
Chile, an elongated littoral country on the Pacific Coast of South America, covers an area
of about 0.75 million sqkm with a population of about 14 million.  Since rainfall varies
from less than 50 mm in arid north to  1250 mm in the temperate south, both the water
availability and water needs show marked regional variations.  Total water use is esti-
mated  to  be  about  34.21 bcum--10.88  bcum of  consumptive  use  and  23.33  of  non-
consumptive use.  Of the total consumptive use, irrigation sector accounts for 89 percent
and domestic sector takes 6 percent with the rest going to the mining and industrial sec-
tors (Brehm and Quiroz,  1995:3).  Of the cultivable area of 5.1 mha, 1.9 mha are irri-
7gated--1.24 mha by surface water and 0.68 mha by groundwater (Gazmuri and Rosegrant,
1994:32).  Despite the predominant share of irrigation in total water use, a high level of
urbanization (85 percent) and an extreme dominance of hydro-power in total energy (93
percent) make Chilean water sector to orient towards its non-irrigation segments.
Being a  small country, Chile has  a unitary form  of government.  Unlike most
other countries in the sample, it presents one of the earliest and most well .developed in-
stitutional arrangements quite favorable for market-based water allocation, decentralized
management, and private sector participation. Although the law considers water resource
as a common property, for all practical purposes, its use is treated as a de facto  private
property attached to land. The perception of water use rights as a private property has be-
come sharper since 1976 when the expropriation of land and water made during the late
1960s and early 1970s were reversed by a new government.  Thanks to the  1981 Water
Code and 1988 Constitution, water use right is treated--both legally and practically--as a
private property independent of land that can be traded, used as collateral, and treated as
assets for tax purposes (see Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1994). Added to a relatively mature
legal system, Chilean water administration also has a better demarcation of responsibili-
ties between water-related state organizations, water supply and sewerage service agen-
cies, private construction companies, and WUAs.  While the state grants quantified water
rights to all users, an active water market facilitates reallocation of such entitlements both
within and across sectors with WJUAs  and courts resolving all water-related conflicts (see
Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1994; Brehm and Quiroz, 1995; Heme and Easter, 1995).
Interestingly, project construction by state agencies is made conditional on users'
prior agreement to pay the full project cost over time and WJUAs--both  at the project, ca-
nal, and channel levels--are responsible for system maintenance, water distribution,  and
fee collection.  Since WVUAs  in Chile, unlike their counterparts in other countries, involve
users with individual water use rights, they are more effective both in facilitating water
transfers as well as in tackling local level water conflicts.  In urban sector, although 92
percent of the water supply and sanitation systems are public, most of them are trying to
be financially  autonomous by increasing the equity participation of both general public
and private investors.  The corporatization and privatization of state-owned water supply
agencies as well as the entry of private water companies have led to an increase both in
coverage  and quality of water supply and sanitation services (Gazmuri and Rosegrant,
1994:25).  Notably, the policy of market allocation and privatization in Chile is also ac-
companied by state protection to poor farmers and urban users through a policy of de-
mand, rather than supply, side subsidy, i.e., the poor pay the same price but get lump sum
subsidy to cover their excess water bill.
While Chilean water sector is institutionally far advanced than many countries, it
still faces some key challenges. The most important among them are:
*  Growing inter-sectoral conflicts between irrigation and power sectors (a phenomenon
quite unique to Chilean topography) as well as between irrigation and urban uses;
*  Countering speculation in water rights especially by electric power companies that
encourages non-use and crowds out farmers and other smaller users;
8*  Infusing spatial aspects to water rights (i.e., definition of what a water right means in
terms of volume in different diversion points) to  avoid third-party-effects and thin
water markets (Saleth, Braden, and Eheart, 1991; Donoso, 1996; Blanco; 1996);
*  Ensuring minimum in-stream flow in ecologically sensitive rivers/streams especially
by assigning the right on return flows to environment); and
*  Reducing  water pollution  from  industrial waste  disposal and urban  sewerage  and
protecting, thereby, an acceptable level of water quality;
Currently, there are notable legal and policy initiatives to address some of these
problems.  The recent decision of the supreme court that upheld farmers' claim over that
of electric power companies provides a legal basis for resolving the conflict between con-
sumptive  and non-consumptive uses.  To avoid speculation and discourage large  scale
water rights transfer from agriculture to  power and urban sectors, the  1992 legislative
proposal has suggested two key aspects: forfeiture if non-use for over 5 years and limiting
water rights to specific use.  Although these proposed changes are interpreted as risking
both  the  security  and  transferability  of  water  rights  (e.g.,  Gazmuri  and  Rosegrant,
1994:23), they are, however, needed to maintain a balance in inter-sectoral allocation,
prevent monopoly tendencies, and encourage better water utilization.  On the water qual-
ity side, the Environmental Law of 1994 not only mandates water supply agencies to treat
urban waste  water before its  discharge but  also requires water allocation  for meeting
ecological needs (i.e., minimum in-stream flows).  Following this law, water treatment
plants have already been established in Santiago and Arica and the treated water is tar-
geted for agricultural use in both cases.
Brazil
Brazil, the fifth largest country in the world, covers an area of 8.5 million sqkm and a
population of about 150 million.  Being a country of continental size, rainfall varies from
600 to 3600 mm and, as a result, water resource potential has an uneven regional pattern.
Of the total water resource potential of 2587 bcum, 80 percent occur in the Amazon re-
gion with 63 percent territory but 5 percent population whereas just 4 percent occur in the
north-eastern part with 13 percent area but with 33 percent population.  Water scarcity is,
therefore, acute in areas of population concentration and economic importance.  Irrigated
area is about 2.8 mha representing just 5 percent of the cultivated area and 10 percent of
the ultimate irrigation potential.  Although irrigation sector has a dominant share in water
use,  the  main  motivation  for  most  water  development  schemes  comes  from  hydro-
power/urban water supply.  With 75 percent of the population in urban areas and 93 per-
cent of the total energy from hydro-power, Brazilian water sector is essentially oriented
towards non-irrigation sectors.
Brazil is a federal country with relatively stronger regional governments.  Since
1988, there were notable developments in the legal and organizational spheres of water
management both at the federal and at the state levels.  By delineating 'federal  waters'
from  'state  waters',  the 1988 Constitution has made both the federal and state govern-
ments responsible for managing water in their respective jurisdiction (see Azevedo and
9Simpson, 1995).  While the abolition of the notion of 'private waters'  precludes owner-
ship rights in water, authorized private use rights are, however, allowed.  The long domi-
nation of the power sector in water sector development finally ended in  1995 with the
transfer of water from the Ministry of Mining and Energy to the newly created Ministry
of Environment, Water Resources, and Legal Amazon.  The Secretariat of Hydraulic Re-
sources created under the latter Ministry is given planning and regulatory powers over all
water uses.  The National Water Resource Policy Law, though delayed since 1991 due to
federal-state disagreements, was finally passed in 1997 [see Federative Republic of Brazil
(FRB),  1997].  In the meantime, eight major states have also passed their water laws.
Since these  changes  effected at the  national level  are  neither  given time  to  pervade
through lower echelons of water administration nor accompanied by clear-cut operational
policies, their impact on water sector performance is obviously limited.  As a result, seri-
ous problems like the following continue to haunt water sector performance.
*  Ensuring managerial and regulatory coordination between federal and state waters;
Promoting consistent water laws and policies among states within the federal struc-
ture;
*  Creating participatory mechanisms for inter-state/inter-sectoral water conflicts;
Strengthening water planning and administrative structures through capacity building
and technological upgradation;
Addressing  water pollution  to  preserve water quality  in  the industrially  advanced
south-eastern region while solving water scarcity in rural-based north-eastern regions;
*  Increasing users' participation and cost recovery; and
*  Preparing the way for the development of water pernit  and pollution license systems
to provide incentives for efficient water use and effective pollution control.
There are several recent initiatives with the express purpose of improving mana-
gerial coordination and resolving water conflicts within the federal framework.  These
initiatives  include the creation of the National  Water Resource Management System--
covering National  Collegiate as well as Basin  Commissions--and the establishment of
national, basin, and state level water councils.  However, these institutional structures are
in a formative stage and need time to articulate themselves well within the existing sys-
tem.  Notwithstanding the serious attempt to consolidate water issues within a single ad-
ministrative apparatus, there are many water-related functions (e.g., irrigation, extension,
pure and adaptive research, urban water supply, and water quality) that still remain ad-
ministratively dispersed requiring effective integration with broader water management
concerns.  The 1997 law also remains largely silent on water pollution  especially from
urban sewerage that has become a critical problem in major cities like Sao Paulo and Rio
de Janeiro.  Decentralization and privatization programs (e.g., urban water supply) also
need to be packaged well within the overall reform strategy.
The legal and policy changes remain incomplete as long as the intermediary in-
stitutional structures are still to be put in place both at the federal and state levels.  How-
ever, it cannot be denied that Brazilian water sector environment and management  ap-
proach did  undergo remarkable change thanks to the policy  level articulation of many
progressive ideas and approaches.  These ideas and approaches include water as an eco-
10nomic good, integrated approach to  water resource management, targeted strategies to
address region and sector-specific water challenges, decentralization through user partici-
pation  (e.g.,  'water  democratization')  and  basin  level  organizations  (e.g.,  'watershed
committees'),  water concession/permits, and cost  sharing based  on user pay principle.
Judging by the general direction of institutional changes observed till now and the politi-
cally committed government to deepen the reform process, Brazilian water sector is in a
stronger position to strengthen its institutional foundation and to realize, thereby, tangible
gains in terms of perfornance  improvement in the near future.
Spain
Spain, a peninsular country in Europe with frequent drought problems, covers an area of
about 0.5 million sqkm  and a population,  more or less, stabilized around  40 million.
Mean annual precipitation is 668 mm.  Uneven seasonal and regional patterns in water
availability necessitate large storages and extensive intra and inter-basin water transfers.
While the total water resource potential is estimated to be 114 bcum, annual withdrawal
is only 47 bcum--41.5 bcum from surface and 5.5 bcum from sub-surface sources [Direc-
cion General de  Obras Hidraulicas (DGOH), 1996:2].  Of the total consumptive with-
drawal of 31 bcum, the respective shares of agriculture, urban supply, and industrial sec-
tor are 81, 13, and 6 percent.  Irrigated area is 3.2 mha--2.3 mha from surface water and
0.9 mha from groundwater--representing 13 percent of the total cultivated area.  About 35
percent of total water withdrawal is also used for the non-consumptive purpose of hydro-
power generation. Unlike most European countries, the water sector in Spain has a strong
orientation towards its irrigation segment.
Although  Spain is  a  federation of  'Autonomous  Communities'  (AC),  it has  a
strong federal government playing a dominant role in the water sector.  Being a member
of the European Community (EC), the water sector in Spain is also influenced by EC's
agricultural and environmental policies.  This external influence and the unique tradition
of water administration through river basin organizations (RBOs) dating as far back as
1926 distinguish Spain from the rest of the sample.  Spain has 14--nine inter-community
and 5 intra-community--RBOs known as 'Confederaciones Hidrograficas'  which are re-
sponsible for water development, inter sectoral allocation, water pricing, authorization of
water and discharge permits, and water quantity and quality monitoring  as well as en-
forcement in their respective jurisdictions.  Although they are autonomous with formal
mechanisms for stakeholders' participation, their budgetary dependence due to low water
charges and poor recovery makes them less autonomous and more bureaucratic.  Operat-
ing below the RBOs are the municipalities and irrigation communities which distribute
water, collect charges, and resolve conflicts at the local levels.  The federal government,
apart from its budgetary support to inter-community RBOs, enacts laws, sets overall poli-
cies, and provides overall regulatory guidance.
The  1985 water law that replaced the  1879 water law, though makes water re-
source as a public property, allows users to obtain use-specific water and discharge per-
mits from RBOs.  Such a legal distinction made between water as a resource and water as
11n usufruct is very crucial to reconcile the conflicts between the public and private goods
properties of water.  As mandated by this law with a basic thrust on integrated approach
to water management, a comprehensive National Water Plan together with Basin Water
Plans  has  been  prepared  in  1993  [see  Ministero  de  Obras  Publicas  Y  Transportes
(MOPT),  1993].  But for its irrigation component, the Plan is yet to be adopted.  In the
meantime,  similar plans with time-bound targets for sewerage treatment and  discharge
regulation have also been prepared during 1994-95 so as to meet EC directives in this re-
gard.  On the water administration side, Water Commissions both at the federal and ba-
sins levels have also been set in place to serve as advisorial bodies for technical and pol-
icy level consultations.  While Spain has all the right set of water-related institutional ar-
rangements, their impact on water sector performance is far from satisfactory partly due
to weak links among institutions and partly due to politically entangled and poorly  im-
plemented water pricing and cost recovery policies.  The major challenges facing Spanish
water sector are:
*  Implementing the legal provision of full-cost recovery including investment costs;
*  Modernization of water storage and distribution networks and extending the installa-
tion of water measuring devices to all irrigation systems (Ortega, et al., 1997);
X  Enhancing the use efficiency and productivity of irrigation water with a better inte-
gration of water delivery with farm inputs, technologies, and extension services;
*  Strengthening the RBOs with financial self-sufficiency, functional autonomy, and a
still deeper involvement of users;
*  Addressing environmental issues including groundwater depletion, water quality, and
minimum flow requirements;
*  Encouraging private sector investment and participation in water management, sewer-
age treatment, and pollution control; and
*  Removing the legal and organizational rigidities to permit market-based solutions to
inter/intra-sectoral/regional water allocation and quantity-quality conflicts.
It  is easier to meet EC's  targets for subsidy removal and water quality  mainte-
nance than to resolve the socio-economic problems due to a 10 percent reduction in irri-
gated area required under EC's commodity restriction programs.  Apart from an accurate
commodity planning and a carefully designed diversification program, there is also the
critical need for creating mechanisms for protecting/compensating the water permits of
farmers and regions subject to such restrictions.  Since water markets can be a part of the
solution in  such situations (Garrido,  1997), deliberate policies and legal provisions are
needed to facilitate the emergence and growth of such markets.  Recently, there are nota-
ble initiatives both in the legal, policy, and the administrative spheres of Spanish water
sector.  These initiatives include the proposals to introduce private and transferable use
rights,  grant full financial autonomy to RBOs,  make construction of new projects  de-
pendent on users'  prior agreement to pay full costs (as in Chile), and encourage private
sector participation in construction, distribution, sewerage treatment, and pollution  con-
trol.  With EC's  directives exerting strong pressure for financial discipline and quality
standard, these proposals, if implemented soon with least compromise, could strengthen
existing water institutions and place the Spanish water sector on a sustainable path of per-
formance improvement.
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Morocco stretches along the coast of north-west Africa.  It covers an area of 0.7 million
sqkm and a population of about 27 million.  Since the mean annual precipitation is only
about 200 mm, water resource availability is extremely limited both seasonally and spa-
tially.  Of the total 20 bcum water resources which could be mobilized, 11 bcum  are cur-
rently being used.  Of the total water utilized, agriculture accounts for 90 percent,  and
domestic and industrial uses share the rest.  The irrigated area is approximately 1.0 mha,
of which 50 percent is irrigated by large schemes.  It covers only 11 percent of cultivable
area but 80 percent of the potentially irrigable area (World Bank,  1993:2).  While agri-
culture constitutes just  17 percent of GDP, it accounts for 40 percent of employment and
30 percent  of export earnings.  Despite the ethical and political eminence of drinking
water, Moroccan water sector is basically centered on its irrigation segment.
Although provincial governments are gaining importance since the democratiza-
tion process started in the 1960s, Morocco remains still highly centralized.  In contrast,
water administration evinces considerable decentralization and functional specialization.
The Directorate General of Hydraulics under the Ministry of Equipment (MOE) plans and
develops water resources. The National Office of Potable Water, again under MOE, ac-
quires and distributes water not only on a retail basis to households and industries in ma-
jor urban  centers but also on a bulk  supply basis to municipal/provincial governments.
The nine Regional Authorities for Agricultural Development (RAADs) under the Minis-
try of Agriculture (MOA) develop and maintain water distribution networks, acquire and
distribute water, collect water charges, and provide farm inputs and extension services.
In smaller  systems including groundwater areas, on the other hand,  local governments
and farmers play a stronger role in water distribution and system maintenance.
The new Water Code of 1995 has led to significant changes both in the spheres of
water policy and water administration.  The law makes the Supreme Water Council (in-
volving all major water sector stakeholders) as the key agency for water policy at the na-
tional level and River Basin Organization (covering one or more RAADs) as the nodal
agency for water administration at the regional level (the first RBO has been created in
1997).  The National Water Plan and Basin Water Plans are to provide technical frame-
work for formulating both national and regional strategies for water management.  The
law that advocates the user-pay principle and full cost recovery allows for the imposition
of  both  water  abstraction and  pollution  taxes.  On the  legal  side,  although  water  is
brought to the public domain, the new law permits authorized use rights and also recog-
nizes the ownership rights obtained as per the 1914 law.  While these macro level devel-
opments are indicative of a positive change in the overall institutional environment within
the water  sector, key challenges continue to limit water sector perfornance.  They in-
clude:
*  Enhancing water use efficiency and conservation especially in the agricultural sector
through the installation of water meters and the adoption of water saving technologies
as well as the modification of existing cropping patterns;
13*  Improving cost recovery and  system maintenance through  the promotion  of active
WUAs and by the effective application of the 1995 Water Code;
*  Strengthening further the existing practice of integrating water delivery with the pro-
vision of farm inputs and extension services;
*  Ensuring  administrative  and  operational  cohesion  between  agricultural  and  water
sector agencies both at the national and at the local levels;
*  Extending the current policy of making urban water supply agencies operationally
autonomous and financially self-dependent;
*  Protecting water quality and developing cost effective schemes for waste water treat-
ment and water reuse;  and
*  Encouraging private sector participation in water technology development and exten-
sion, urban water distribution, and waste water treatment.
The element common to all these problems is that their solution requires effective
and cohesive implementation of water sector policies and programs.  A recent ministerial
reorganization that brought together agriculture, water, and environment under the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Equipment, and Environment was meant not only for enhancing ad-
ministrative cohesion between water and agricultural sector agencies but also for pursu-
ing  an integrated approach towards water quantity and quality management.  However,
following 1998 elections, this situation was reversed where Agriculture and Environment
are now two separate ministries and Environnment  is now a department in the Ministry of
Territories.
The ongoing programs for canal lining, pressurized canal water supply, and the
application of sprinkler and drip systems need to be pursued still more vigorously to en-
hance water use efficiency and conservation.  The urban water conservation achieved in
cities like Rabat thanks to demand-side management instruments including price policy
and water education has to be extended to other urban centers.  The recent agreement that
a French company had with the city of Casablanca for water distribution has generated
considerable interest among other major cities for similar privately managed water supply
arrangements.  Private  consulting firms--both domestic  and  foreign--have tremendous
service, technology,  and investment potential for participation in various  water-related
activities including waste-water treatment for reuse.  As Morocco begins to consolidate
the implementation capacity of its water institutions and exploit available local and pri-
vate sector organizational, technical, and financial capabilities, it will be relatively well
placed to gain from an improved water sector performance in the coming years.
Israel
Israel, a  tiny but  one  among the  most  innovative countries  in water management,  is
stretched along the eastern Mediterranean coast covering an area of about 0.002 million
sqkm and a population of 5.7 million.  The mean annual precipitation varies from 355.6
mm in the north to just a 25.42 mm in the southern desert.  Of the total water supply of
1.93 bcum, 82 percent represent fresh water and the rest are treated effluents (12 percent)
and brackish water (6 percent).  As Israel has already exhausted its fresh water supply, the
14only additional supply sources available within its borders are the indirect supplies from
treated sewerage and water saving effected from strict demand-side managenient (Arloso-
roff, 1997a:8). Of the total water demand of 1.93 bcum (same as the supply), the respec-
tive  shares of agricultural, domestic,  and industrial  sectors are 63, 30, and  7 percent.
Since domestic and industrial sectors have higher priority, the fresh water allocation to
agriculture is declining but the allocation of brackish and treated sewerage waters is in-
creasing.  With relative water scarcity and high cost of fresh water for irrigation, the irri-
gation sector (0.23 mha) is constantly substituting capital and technology for water.  With
the overarching concern for supporting population settlements, Israeli water sector, ori-
ented  initially  towards  its  irrigation  segment,  has  now  shifted its  focus  on  its  non-
irrigation segments.
Being small, Israel has a unitary form of government.  The 1959 water law that
makes water a public property remains the foundation for present water policy and water
administration.  The Water Commission (WC), previously under the Ministry  of Agri-
culture (MOA) but now under the Ministry of Infrastructure (MOI), implements the water
law, plans, develops, allocates, and manages water, and sets and annually revises water
prices with the approval of a special parliamentary committee.  Apart from the MQA and
MOI, both the treasury and commerce ministries also have a strong influence on the wa-
ter sector.  At the operational level, the WC relies on Mekorot, a state-owned water com-
pany that produces and distributes around 70 percent of water supply in the country.  Me-
korot operates the National  Water Carrier, the pipeline system that moves water south-
wards from Lake Galilee to Negev desert.  In recent years, Mekorot has also entered in
spheres like urban water retail, sewerage treatment, and sea water desalination.  The WC
receives technical planning as well as research and development support from Tahal, a
large engineering consulting firm.  Although this firm used to  be the official and sole
water planner for the past 20 years or so, now it is made to compete with other engineer-
ing companies within Israel to obtain project contracts from government.
Although water policy and administration are centraiized with considerable politi-
cal overtones, the water sector in Israel is subject to a much stronger economic influence
than its counterparts in other countries.  This is partly due to metered volumetric alloca-
tion and partly due to a relatively stricter economic water pricing system.  While inter-
sectoral water allocation is done administratively on political grounds to favor domestic
and industrial sectors, water prices in these sectors are higher and cover full costs.  Even
though  irrigation water is subsidized, the  subsidy has declined from 75 to  50 percent
since the progressive block rate pricing introduced in 1987 that penalizes large and fresh
water consumers (Yaron, 1997).  Water wastage is the least in all sectors and water pro-
ductivity has increased more than 250 percent in agriculture and 80 percent in industry.
While Israel has one of the best performning  water sector in the world, it still faces crucial
challenges most of which are characteristic of a mature water economy operating in an
acute water stress condition.  These challenges include:
*  Addressing the potential side-effects for increasing brackish and waste water use in
agriculture (e.g., groundwater contamination, soil sanity, and health hazards);
15*  Allowing  and facilitating  the exchange of water permits to  promote  market-based
water allocation and compensation;
*  Redefining the role of public agencies to avoid centralization and permit private sec-
tor participation;
*  Making WC free from political pressures and rebuilding its own planning and regu-
latory capabilities;
*  Building  consensus  on  crucial  areas  of  disagreement  (e.g.,  supply  augmentation
through water transfers from Lebanon and Turkey and sea water desalination, install-
ing national/regional carriers for saline/waste water collection  and distribution,  and
decentralization and privatization of Mekorot); and
*  Sharing water with Jordan and  the Palestinian Authority and  creating institutional
structures for the joint management of shared groundwater aquifers.
Most of the issues, except the last three, have been addressed by the 1997 report
of the Public  Commission on Water Sector (Arlosoroff, 1997b).  With an already  ex-
hausted fresh water supply, an estimated future annual growth in water demand of 0.03
bcum means the inevitable need for costly options like sea water desalination.  However,
the immediate adoption of this option can bury the scope for considerable water saving
through  effective demand management and market-based inter-sectoral transfers.  It  is,
therefore, necessary to  first  undertake water sector reform that  can permit  a  strategic
short-run delay so as to pave a strong long-run economic and institutional foundation for
the eventual adoption of the desalination option (see Arlosoroff, 1997a and 1997b).
The heart of the Commission's  reform proposal involves market-based approach
and privatization within a strong regulatory framework.  A legislative proposal, which is
currently before the Israeli parliament, aims to enhance private sector role in areas like
urban water distribution, operation and maintenance, and sewerage treatment.  There is an
increasing  support for the promotion of market-based water allocations as well as the
adoption of pricing  schemes that include also a shadow price (rent) for water as a re-
source (see Kislev,  1993).  While the eventual need to  share the scarce water with the
Palestinian Authority is recognized, academic efforts outside the official circle are afoot
to  explore feasible joint management mechanisms for managing shared aquifers within
the existing institutional set-up (see Feitelson and Haddad, 1995).
South Africa
South Africa, a country building a democratic polity out of an erstwhile apartheid system,
covers an area of 1.3 million sqkm and a population of 42 million.  Mean annual precipi-
tation is 497 mm.  The total utilizable water resource potential is 35.4 bcum--30 bcum
from surface and 5.4 bcum from sub-surface sources.  Of the total potential, 50 percent of
surface water and 37 percent of groundwater are already developed and utilized [Depart-
ment of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), 1985]. As to the inter-sectoral share, agri-
culture accounts for 55 percent, domestic sector for 8 percent, and mining and industrial
sectors for 16 percent with the rest is being to meet environmental needs.  Although the
irrigated area  of  1.3 mha--1.1 mha  by  surface water and  0.2 mha  by  groundwater--
16represents just  10 percent of the cultivable area, irrigation cannot be expanded much be-
yond due to the limited availability of irrigable lands [see Water Research Commission
(WRC),  1996:28].  Of the  total  irrigated area,  44  percent  is  under  private  (mostly
groundwater) irrigation, 30 percent is under irrigation boards, and the rest is under public
irrigation (WRC, 1996:35).  The use of irrigation technology is very high in South Africa
as indicated by the area shares of sprinklers (54 percent) and micro irrigation (12 per-
cent).  Human right and socio-economic issues that become important in the new South
African setting have reoriented the focus of water sector from its power, mining, and in-
dustrial segments towards its irrigation and domestic segments.
South Africa has a three-tiered federal system with national, provincial, and local
governments.  According to the new Constitution, water resource planing and develop-
ment functions are with the national government whereas agriculture, the major water
user, is with the provincial governments.  The local municipal governments have the re-
sponsibility for domestic and industrial water supply.  The water sector in South Africa is
undergoing radical changes due to the new water law that forms part of an overall process
of post-Apartheid economic and political reconstruction.  As a result, the 1956 water law
is going to be soon replaced by a new law currently at the approval stage.  The new law
that aims to correct existing inequalities in the water sector defines a modem framework
conducive  for  decentralization, market-based water allocation,  full cost  recovery,  and
economically rooted water management (see DWAF, 1997).
Although the law makes water resource as a public property, it does allow private
and tradable use rights obtainable through application from the DWAF.  While the law
aims to reorient and strengthen existing water administration including research organi-
zations, it also calls for the creation of new structures like basin entities (e.g., the Catch-
ment Management Agencies) within which existing water distribution agencies like irri-
gation  boards  and  municipalities  will  participate  as  stakeholders  along  with  farmer
groups.  Although WUAs are there at present only in the sugarcane zones and in the pub-
lic irrigation systems having farmer liaison committees, they are to play an active role in
water distribution and management in future.  In urban sector, utility-type autonomous
organizations are planned.  The water courts created under the earlier law are to be re-
placed by more accessible Natural Resources Courts and any conflicts not solved either
by these courts or by the DWAF can go to regular courts for their resolution.  Since these
reform proposals  address most of the traditional water sector concerns, they, if imple-
mented effectively,  could vastly improve the  capability and performance of the water
sector.  The key challenges facing the South African water sector at present are, therefore,
related essentially to implementation aspects like:
*  Building technical and information capacity within the water sector;
*  Modernizing existing projects to allow volumetric allocation and improve delivery ef-
ficiency necessary for the eventual introduction of the proposed water permit system;
*  Enhancing the regulatory and monitoring capabilities of the DWAF for establishing
permit-based water allocation system;
17*  Developing  strong WUAs as an  organizational basis for water distribution,  system
maintenance, cost recovery, water transfers, and conflict resolutions;
*  Achieving high  degree of coordination not only among various layers of water ad-
ministration--both the existing and the proposed ones--but also among various levels
of government;
•  Resolving the conflict between the economic goal of full cost recovery with the eq-
uity goal of supporting the underprivileged; and
*  Integrating water quality and ecological concerns within the system  of private  and
group-centered water allocation and management.
The document  titled as the  'Fundamental  Principles  and  Objectives  of a New
Water Law in South Africa' as approved by the Cabinet in November 1996 provides an
agreed framework for a new water law.  Similarly, the 'White Paper on a National Water
Policy for South Africa'  prepared by the DWAF (1997) outlines the contour of a new
water policy.  Notably, both these documents give top priority for capacity building, in-
formation gathering, and human resource development in water sector.  The critical need
to link existing research, training, and technical agencies--both in the public and private
sectors--with the main line water administration is recognized.  As a way of promoting
regulatory/monitoring  specialization within water administration, there  is also a  recent
proposal for creating a National Public Water Utility for the express purpose of financing,
developing, and operating all water infrastructures in the country (see DWAF, 1997:29).
The relative  success of water boards, the regional public utilities for bulk  water
supply, has led to the proposal for the creation of new regional water utilities.  Some of
these proposals have already been crystallized as in the case of Lesotho Highlands Water
Project and Komati Basin Water Authority.  Water charges, which are prevalent only in
public irrigation at present, will be increased and extended also to private irrigation to
cover not  only the operation and maintenance (O&M) and capital costs but  also other
components like research levy and water conservation/management fees.  To  preserve
equity, water charges will vary by regions and projects with an added scope for subsidiz-
ing the poor on the demand rather than on the supply side.
One of the major gaps in the reform proposal is related to water use-induced envi-
ronmental  effects  including  waterlogging  and  salinity  that  are  serious problems  in  a
quarter of the area currently under irrigation.  Under the present set-up, it is not  clear
whether it is the national or provincial governments that will address these problems as
both  have concurrent responsibility  in environment management.  This  issue,  like the
general issue of achieving administrative and operational coordination in water manage-
ment, can, however, be addressed by establishing effective liaison committees.  The ma-
jor reform challenge lies in achieving the equity goal of water redistribution to favor the
hitherto neglected groups without creating uncertainty among investors.  However, if the
reform proposals are operationalized in their original form without much political com-
promise, South Africa can be in a stronger position than many African and Asian coun-
tries to improve its water sector performance.
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Sri Lanka, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, covers an area of 0.066 million sqkm and
a population of about 17.6 million.  Although annual average precipitation is fairly high
at about 2000 mm, in view of its seasonal concentration and the drainage-related topogra-
phy of the country, its water supply implication is somewhat limited.  The total water re-
source potential of the country is estimated at 43 bcum.  The total amount of water with-
drawal is 6.3 boum per year.  Irrigation uses about 92 percent of the water with the rest
being used for meeting domestic and industrial uses, 0.1 and 7.9 percent, respectively.
(World Bank,  1997: Table  10, pg. 232).  The irrigated area is about 0.595 mha.  The
composition of irrigated area is as follows.  Medium and major surface water schemes
(0.30 mha) (command area 80-600 ha and > 600 ha respectively), which are under public
surface irrigation systems (there are no private surface irrigation systems) maintained by
the Irrigation Department and Mahaweli Authority. Minor surface water schemes (0.235
mha) (command area <80 ha) which are supposed to be maintained by the farmers under
the technical guidance of Provincial Irrigation Departments.  Groundwater irrigation us-
ing shallow open-dug wells mainly in the North-Western, Northern and North-eastern ar-
eas covers 0.060 mha, which are 100 % privately owned by individual farners.
Since 80 percent of the industrial units are located in and around Colombo, the
capital city, industrial water use in Sri Lanka is essentially a part of the water supply task
of this city.  Although urbanization is not a serious problem (as 80 percent of the popula-
tion is either rural or semi-urban), domestic water supply needs are also growing.  With
limited water resource potential, water deficit projected for the year 2000 is 0.2 bcum in
Mahaweli development regions, 0.92 boum in the Southwest dry zone, and 1.4 bcum in
the northern  dry zone  [see Water Resources  Council  (WRC),  1997:3].  Since hydro-
power accounts for about 75 percent of the country's energy supply, the non-consumptive
use of power generation is also equally important. Despite the growth in non-irrigation
needs, the continuing importance of irrigation for both food self-sufficiency and farm ex-
ports keep the focus of the Sri Lankan water sector almost exclusively on its irrigation
segment.
Sri Lanka, formerly with a unitary form of government, has adopted the federal
system  through  a  constitutional  amendment  in  1987.  Following  the  constitutional
amendment, water sector responsibilities were divided between the central government
and provincial councils in 1990.  While intra-provincial irrigation planning, implementa-
tion, and management are with the provincial governments, the responsibilities for inter-
provincial irrigation schemes and overall water resource planning, water storage, drain-
age, and flood protection are with the union government.  However, the definition of
authority  with respect to  domestic and  industrial water supply, and  recreational needs
continues to remain blurred (Upadhyay, 1996). Although the Water Resources Board Act
(No. 24 of  1964) authorizes Water Resources Board to control, regulate and develop as
well as conserve and protect water resources including groundwater, it has failed to fulfill
its mission.  At present, although Irrigation Department and Mahaweli Authority regulate
19and control surface water development and use, management of groundwater resources is
no one's responsibility.
Of some 40 government agencies that wield a varying degree of influence over the
Sri Lankan water sector, seven are most important as they form the core of water admini-
stration at the national level (see Nanni,  1996).  The Ministry of Irrigation, Power, and
Energy and the Ministry of Mahaweli Development are both responsible.for  water re-
source planning and irrigation development.  The National Water Supply and Drainage
Board and the Urban Development Authority--both under the Ministry of Housing, Con-
struction, and Public Utilities--are responsible for domestic and industrial water supply.
Since there is no single agency responsible for groundwater development and use,
Agriculture department as well as National Water Supply and Drainage Board, Ministry
of Industries, private industries and groundwater farmers are engaged in groundwater de-
velopment and use without any legislative or administrative control.  The Central Envi-
ronment  Authority under the Ministry of Transport, Environment, Forest, and Women
Affairs  is responsible for all ecological aspects of water development including  water
quality.
There are inter-ministerial bodies (e.g., the Central Coordination Committee on Ir-
rigation Management and the Steering Committee on Water  Supply and  Sanitation) to
promote coordination in specific segments of water sector.  However, neither they are ef-
fective in ensuring administrative cohesion nor can be a substitute for the currently miss-
ing national level body needed for sector-wide coordination, allocation, and management.
While over 50 different acts influence the water sector, Sri Lanka has neither an enacted
water law nor a declared water policy needed to provide the legal framework for an inte-
grated approach to water resources management.  A draft Water Resources Bill being dis-
cussed since the early 1980s, though not adopted, has all the right ingredients for a mod-
em  water  law.  The  Bill  advocates  water  permit  systems,  full  cost  pricing,  inter-
ministerial  Water  Resources Council  (WRC) as a coordination mechanism, and water
courts for conflict resolution (see World Bank, 1992:168).  Recently, with the technical
and financial support from donor agencies like the Asian Development Bank, Food and
Agriculture  Organization, and technical support from the International Water  Manage-
ment Institute (IWMI), the government is planning a major change in the legal and ad-
ministrative spheres of the water sector.  The Action Plan for Comprehensive Water Re-
sources Management that calls for the development of water policy, water law, autono-
mous water administration, basin planning, and water information base  (WRS, 1997:3)
has suggested the creation of both the WRC and its executive organ, the Water Resources
Secretariat (WRS).  Both the WRC and WRS have already been established as transitory
arrangements to advise, develop, and oversee a permanent institutional arrangement.
While macro level institutional changes are gradually building up, there are sig-
nificant micro level initiatives particularly in the irrigation sector.  When the failure of
cost recovery attempts initiated in  1984 has become transparent in 1989, the government
adopted the policy of turning over the overall management responsibilities to legally reg-
20istered  WJUAs. With policy and technical inputs from international organizations like
ILMI, specialized agencies within both the Ministry of Irrigation and the Minfistry  of Ag-
riculture have played a concerted role in promoting WUAs.  By March 1997, 757 WtUAs
have been registered with an operating area of 85700 ha [Mahaweli Economic Authority
(MEA), 1997].  Notably, following the government policy of promoting women WUAs
initiated since 1995, there are now 249 women WUAs excluding 149 other active women
organizations in rural areas.'  Since the WUAs are registered under the Agrarian Services
Act, they can obtain loans from banks and serve as the organizational basis for an inte-
grated delivery of water with other farm inputs and extension services. The Project Man-
agement Committees--functioning  as the top  layer of WUAs at the system level--have
also been promoted to vertically integrate the process of user participation in irrigation
management.  Although there are notable management improvements in the turned over
areas, many key problems like the following continue to disturb the overall performance
of the Sri Lankan water sector:
*  Achieving  a national consensus for expediting the creation of the institutional  ar-
rangements outlined in the Action Plan;
*  Developing the implementing rules for water law including the creation of allocation
and regulatory mechanisms as well as water and pollution permit systems;
*  Linking the macro level allocation and regulatory mechanisms with their project and
local level counterparts like WUAs;
*  Reviving, creating, and strengthening basin level organizations through a concurrent
process of debureaucratization and stakeholder participation;
- Advancing management decentralization in irrigation sector and expanding it to cover
urban water sector particularly through the creation of administratively autonomous
and financially self-dependent water utilities;
3  Building the necessary technical, managerial, and informational capabilities;
v  Addressing major sustainability concerns like catchment degradations, groundwater
depletion, and water quality deteriorationl, and;
*  Increasing political commitment of government for cost recovery in irrigation.
Addressing the macro and micro level institutional issues is the key for realizing
the overall goal of creating a market responsive, financially self-dependent, and environ-
mentally sustainable water sector.  Although environmental legislation has adequate pro-
As was commented by a reviewer, One has to be very cautious in reporting the number of WUAs for a
number of reasons; (i) the WUAs that are discussed in the write-up are in major schemes and do not
refer to farmers organizations in medium and minor schemes; (ii) the statistics of WUAs vary from
report to report; (iii) except in Mahaweli, most of the WUAs have been formed under donor funded
projects.  A large majority  of these WUAs have become  defunct or  weak after the  projects were
closed; (iv)  Under the World Bank-funded, ongoing NIRP about  1,100 farmers organizations have
been formed in 1000 project's minor schemes and 34 medium major schemes - a large majority of
them are  organizationally and financially weak; (v) although WUAs in major  schemes are usually
participating in decision making with respect to seasonal cultivation planning and water release plan-
ning and monitoring, there is no significant evidence that they are self-financing the O&M of  'taken-
over' irrigation facilities.
21visions for ensuring required safeguards, they need to be strengthened further with realis-
tic water quality standards, complementary institutions, and, above all, political commit-
ments (Ratnayake, 1997).  Potential influence can be expected from the ongoing, Bank-
funded Mahaweli Restructuring and Rehabilitation Project (MRRP), and proposed Land
Titling Project/Water Entitlements Study in resolving some of those issues.  The Ma-
haweli Authority was not converted to  Mahaweli Ministry. Instead, a new  'Mahaweli
ministry was created to oversee the Mahaweli Authority.  The ongoing MRRP has helped
the Mahaweli Authority to reduce its redundant staff from 10,000 to 4,000 and would as-
sist it to become a River Basin Agency.
The blue print for a new institutional structure developed by the WRC and WRS,
though could not be established by 1998 as initially planned, is now expected to be put it
in place by the year 2000 (see Berkoff,  1997).  The cascade system of water use, where
the water wasted in upper reaches gets used and reused at lower reaches, ensures a high
level of physical water use efficiency of up to 80 percent.  But, economic efficiency in
water use can be achieved only with a carefully structured water permit  system imple-
mented through  the WUAs.  While the institutional changes planned under the Action
Plan could enhance the role of WUAs, the government has to continue with its current ef-
forts to expand WUAs to cover all large irrigation schemes.
Although  Sri Lanka has a long experience with basin level planning and organi-
zation, the dissolution of earlier basin organizations like Gal Oya and the recent conver-
sion of Mahaweli Development Authority into a Ministry lead to a reversal of its declared
policy of management decentralization.  However, as a part of its declared commitment
for promoting private  sector participation, the government, in  1997, has piloted the op-
eration of a water company with shares owned by farmers and farmer groups in the Ridi
Bendi Ela area.  Since most part of the farmland in Sri Lanka belongs to the state (60%
state owned), the objective promoting private sector participation is linked with land pri-
vatization.  That is, as a part of its commitment to reform its water institutions, Sri Lanka
has to also adjust its agrarian laws and policies.  With the creation of the proposed insti-
tutional structures at the macro level and the consolidation of management decentraliza-
tion and  privatization efforts initiatives at the micro level, the Sri Lankan water sector
will be favorably placed to adequately meet its water quantity and quality challenges of
the next millennium.
Australia
Australia, a thinly populated continental eountry, covers an area of 7.7 million sqkm with
a population of just  18 million.  The annual average precipitation is 465 mm--the lowest
among continents--but varies widely from 200 mm or less in the two-thirds of desert in-
land to 2400 mm or over in the one-third of the country forming the east and north coast
of the  continent.  The total  exploitable water resources  potential  is  estimated  at  188
bcum--l 17.6  bcum  of  surface  water  and  70.4  bcum  of  groundwater  (Pigram,
1986:23&27).  Current use, however, forms only less than 20 percent of the surface and
10 percent of the sub-surface water resource potential.  Such a low level of utilization is
partly due to water quality constraints and partly due to spatial inconsistency between
22water availability and water demand.  Of the 12 drainage divisions, only five covering
just  26 percent of national territory accounts for 88 percent of the total exploitable water
resources.  Agriculture accounts for about 80 percent of the total water use and irrigates
about  1.7 mha.  Almost four-fifths of this irrigated area is concentrated in the Murray-
Darling  basin--the  major  inter-state  river basin  covering  parts  of New  South  Wales
(NSW), Victoria, and Southern Australia.  While the water sector in Australia, as in most
countries,  is oriented towards its irrigation segment, urban as well as recreational and
ecological concerns still remain on top the of water sector agenda.
Australia  is a  federation or commonwealth of government with highly  autono-
mous states.  Although the states have the constitutional responsibility for water resource
management, nevertheless, the central government also has a considerable influence on
the water sector.  The main conveyers of such influence are the financial leverages and
the generally subscribed practice based on the mutually accommodative principle of 'co-
operative federalism'  (see Pigram, et al., 1994).  In view of state-specific variations in
water  issues  and  institutional  features,  national  level  generalization  can  be  difficult.
However, the 1994 Water Reform Agreement of the Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) that aims to unify and strengthen both state and national level water institutions
can still justify a national level perspective of water institutions in Australia.  Since it is
useful to provide a state level perspective, NSW, the state located in the economically and
politically most important region of south-eastern Australia, is considered as a represen-
tative case for both the broad national level water sector concerns and past and ongoing
state level institutional responses.
In view of strong British tradition and common law influence, the water institu-
tions of Australia originally had features suitable more to a water abundant situation than
to the dry reality prevalent in larger parts of Australia.  Although these institutions un-
derwent a process of natural evolution in line with changing water resource realities, a se-
ries  of deliberate  reforms  effected since the  late  1980s has led to  some metamorphic
changes (see  Musgrave,  1997:17).  The riparian  system of water use was replaced by
water license system which, over time, allowed quantitative entitlements, metered supply,
and  volumetric pricing of water (see McGlynn,  1997).  These licenses are issued and
regulated by government departments [e.g., the Department of Land and Water Conser-
vation (DLWC) in NSW].  Although these licenses were originally attached to land, the
reforms undertaken in the 1980s have enabled them to be transferable creating the basic
framework not only for cost recovery but also for the emergence of water markets.
Water is metered widely and pricing is based on volumetric consumption.  The
water charges, which were lower and subsidized as in most other countries, have been in-
creased following the recommendation of the Industry Commission's  Report of  1992.
Water charges usually include an access/license fee, volumetric use charge, and a 'man-
agement fee' in irrigation sector but a 'refurbishment fee' in urban sector.  Inter-state and
inter-regional issues are addressed through river basin organizations operating within an
inter/intra-regional allocation framework conducive for market-based solutions.  Com-
munity involvement is also very high due to the economic stake being created by volu-
23metric water license system and high level of literacy.  In general, the NSW water sector
in particular and Australian water sector in general have one of the best institutional ar-
rangements  that not only delineates the respective sphere of influence for various gov-
ernment  layers and water sector stakeholders but also promotes a desirable mix of ad-
ministrative  regulations and economic instruments.  Although water institutions  in Aus-
tralia are far more advanced than that in many other countries, they are not immune to the
constant  strains engendered by the physical of limits to water resource potential.  The
demand pressure on available water resources has become intense especially after the le-
gally mandated water entitlements for environment (i.e., to maintain water quality and in-
stream water needs).  As such neither the water sector is free from serious problems nor
are the existing water institutions adequate to meet all future water allocation challenges.
The outstanding problems facing the Australian water sector are:
*  Maintaining water quality and protecting water-based ecological systems;
*  Controlling further stress on the already expropriated rivers and depleted aquifers;
i  Fine-tuning the institutional basis for water sharing and market-based allocation;
*  Extending the substitution of economic instruments for administrative regulations;
*  Reshaping the relationship between government and community on the one hand and
the government and private sector on the other hand;
•  Improving the physical health of water storage and distribution infrastructures; and
*  Enhancing the financial and investment self-dependency of the water sector.
All these are challenges facing a maturing water economy that tries to operate in-
creasingly on an economic rather than on an administrative or political realm.  Most of
these issues are being addressed by the reform initiatives undertaken since 1994 when the
Water Reform Agreement was signed by the COAG.  The key components of the agree-
ment are: improving water quality  and environment, refining water rights  system  and
water allocation procedures, pricing water through independent review, and  promoting
community participation (see DLWC, 1998:1).  Since compliance with these principles
entails attractive federal money, most states have already come out with time-bound ac-
tion plans for initiating additional water sector reforms.  The NSW government is the first
to  establish the Independent Pricing and Regulatory  Tribunal  for reviewing the water
pricing  process and  also  to  have both  a comprehensive reform package  as well  as a
framework for its implementation.  As part of its reform initiatives, NSW has adopted a
three level stress-based classification of its rivers and aquifers as the framework for con-
trolling water pollution and water over-exploitation.  The state has also constituted the
Healthy River Commission with the task of monitoring and maintaining water quality and
in-stream flows in all stressed rivers.  Community-based Water Advisory Councils have
been established both at the state as well as at the level of all stressed river and aquifer ar-
eas with the express purpose of involving users in the water sector reform process (see
DLWC,  1997a and 1997b).
Another very unique experiment involving inter-state initiative to control water
stress and water quality deterioration is the agreement reached by the Murray-Darling Ba-
sin Ministerial Council in  1995 calling for a collective cap on water extraction  at the
1993-94 level.  It is certainly a difficult challenge to reverse water use to a reduced level
24observed in the past.  But, both the existing system of volumetric water allocation across
regions, sectors, and individuals as well as a high level of political commitment prompted
mainly  by  an imminent  threat to  everyone within the basin  enhance the prospects  of
achieving the agreed cap.  There are also notable developments at sub-sectoral levels.
Corporatization,  i.e., the conversion of public water utilities into commercially  viable
autonomous entities, and privatization are also increasing both in the urban (e.g., Hunter
Water in 1991 and Sydney Water in 1994) as well as in the irrigation (e.g., Murray Irri-
gation Area  and Coleambally and Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area  in  1997) sectors (see
DLWC,  1997a:8).  The ongoing  institutional changes in Australia are going to  further
strengthen the role of economic instruments and market-based water allocation while, at
the same time, improve the physical health and sustainability of water sector.
China
China, a country of continental size with the world's highest population, covers an area of
9.6 million sqkm and a population of about 1.2 billion.  The annual average precipitation
is 648 mm.  The renewable water resource potential, which was originally estimated at
2812 bcum--1989 bcum from surface and 823 from sub-surface sources [see Ministry of
Water Resources and Electric Power (MOWREP), 1987], has been recently revised up-
wards to  3540 bcum--2711 bcum from surface and  829 bcum from sub-surface sources
(Zhang Hailun, Personal Communication).  Recent estimates also place total water with-
drawal to be  about 511 bcum--425 bcum from surface and  86 bcum from  sub-surface
sources.  As to the inter-sectoral break-up of total water use, the respective shares of agri-
culture,  domestic, and industrial  sectors are: 73.4, 9.2, and 17.4 percent.  The irrigated
area of about 51 mha--42 mha by surface water and 9 mha by groundwater--represents 51
percent of the cultivated area and 80 percent of the potentially irrigable area in the coun-
try.  The non-consumptive uses of water are also important for hydro-power generation
(18  percent  of total  energy) and  inland water-born freight traffic  (42 percent  of total
freight traffic) in China [see Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP),
1997:26-27].  While non-irrigation needs are projected to increase steadily by 5 percent
as against just a 0.5 percent growth for irrigation use [Nanjing Institute of Hydrology and
Water Resources (NIHWR), 1996], the ever crucial food supply and rural income consid-
erations tend to orient the Chinese water sector towards its irrigation segment.  This pic-
ture cannot be completed without referring to  several issues that characterize the water
sector in China:  First, the water availability in China is unevenly distributed across major
provinces.  For example, China's  total water resources are 2,100 cum/year per  capita.
But the Hai, Huai, and Huang River Basins with 34% of China's  population and about
42% of its irrigated land, have a limited amount of water resource reaching 310 cum per
capita.  Second, China is a drought and flood prone country, which is affected frequently
and severely.  These two fact may shed more light on the situation of the water sector in
the country.
China  has  a  centralized political  system  with  considerable  decentralization- of
power across the five layers of government at the national, provincial, prefectural, county,
and community levels.  In water sector, legislative and regulatory powers as well as plan-
25ning and development responsibilities are with the national government but actual man-
agement and maintenance functions are with lower level governments depending upon
the size and location of projects.  Although the ministries of agriculture (influencing irri-
gation), geology and minerals (controlling groundwater), and rural and urban construction
and environmental protection (controlling domestic water supply and water quality) have
a strong influence on the water sector, it is the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR)--
carved out of the erstwhile Ministry of Water Resources and Power in 1988--that forms
the core of the national level water administration in China. The next level administrative
organs are the seven Water Conservancy Commissions (WCCs), which are essentially the
regional  administrative arms of the MOWR, designed to  manage inter-provincial river
basins and lake zones.  While the administrative organs at the provincial, prefectural, and
county levels are the departments or bureaus of water conservancy, the same at the com-
munity level are the water conservancy stations and Irrigation area congresses (similar in
spirit to WUAs).  Although the water administrative organs are vertically integrated from
top to bottom, there is substantial functional specialization and management decentrali-
zation across government layers.  For instance, 77 percent of the total water projects in
the country are managed at the county level and only the rest (inter-country and inter-
provincial) are managed either at provincial levels or by the MOWR and its WCCs (Ke
Lidan, 1997:655).
For enhancing inter and intra-ministerial coordination and solve inter-regional and
inter-sectoral water conflicts, there is the National Leading group of Water Resources and
Water and Soil Conservation Works, a high level inter-ministerial and inter-regional body
chaired by the Vice-Premier.  Similar coordinating bodies were also set up at lower lev-
els.  The basic mechanism for resolving water conflicts is based on mutual consultation
and administrative mediation.  Unresolved conflicts go to the next administrative levels
and, if remain still unresolved, can go to the court.  The 1988 water law, passed after a
decade-long  consultation, aims to  strengthen the regulatory  powers of the existing  ad-
ministrative system and formalize the existing mechanisms for management coordination
and conflict resolution [see Peoples Republic of China (PRC), 1988].  It marks a funda-
mental change both in the water policy and water administration of China.  Considering
water as people's property, the law distinguishes clearly the management and allocation
rights of the state from the use rights of the people.  It calls for permit-based water allo-
cation and full cost-based water charges.  The law stipulates basin as the basic unit of
water management  and mandates the formulation of a national water plan including its
regional and sectoral components.  In many provinces, local water management laws and
regulations area also in force (see Chen, 1992:179).  While the 1988 law is unique for a
socialist country, its implementation will not be easy, even in a socialistic system with a
strong state control, because of the size of the country and its unique water sector with the
dual problem  of floods and droughts.  The major challenges facing the Chinese water
sector are:
*  Protecting a tenth of the country--with a half of population and two-thirds of agricul-
tural and industrial output--from the pernicious effects of periodic floods;
*  Arresting flood-induced soil erosion affecting two-fifths of rural areas;
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the economically important northern part of the country;
*  Controlling water pollution and its health and environmental effects that threaten 436
of the 532 monitored rivers in the country;
v  Reducing groundwater depletion and pollution especially around Beijing and 20 other
major urban centers;
*  Resolving inter-regional/sectoral water sharing conflicts to maintain social stability;
*  Strengthening  administrative  coordination  to  promote  an  integrated  approach  to
floods, water shortage, groundwater, and water quality; and
*  Creating the administrative and regulatory mechanisms  needed for an effective im-
plementation of water law provisions.
In 1997, the Chinese government has undertaken notable steps including the en-
actment of the Law of Flood Control and the declaration of the National Policy on Pollu-
tion Control and Aquatic Protection to address flood and pollution problems.  Targets for
a unified management of water resources were also set for various water-related depart-
ments at all levels with the specific objective of integrating groundwater and water qual-
ity issues with the overall water management concerns.  Still then, the administrative dis-
persal of responsibility continues to be a major hurdle in controlling water pollution and
groundwater depletion.  The State Water Industry Policy declared in December 1997 is a
major step as it allows, for the first time, the entry of private and non-governmental or-
ganizations in water sector and also stipulates the operation of all public water projects on
commercial lines (see PRC,  1997:1).  While this policy  complements and strengthens
water law, it is necessary to create the administrative mechanisms needed for the practical
translation of the legal provisions and policy intentions.  Realizing this, the MOWR has
already prepared the Master Plan of the Water Law and Regulation System as well as the
Water Legal System Construction (see Ke Lidan, 1997: 642&645).  While the issuing of
water drawing permits is already in progress, the creation of the full institutional struc-
tures  needed to  support the permit-based water allocation system is expected to be  in
place by the year 2010.  When this happens, China will be the first country to have a na-
tional level water institution centered on a legalized system of water allocation.
India
India, the second most populous and the seventh largest country, covers an area of 3.29
million sqkm and a population of about 960 million.  Being a large country, the annual
average precipitation varies from 130 mm in Rajasthan dessert to 11000 mm--the world's
highest rainfall--in  Assam mountains.  The total  utilizable water resource potential  is
placed at 1074 bcum--621 bcum from surface and 453 bcum from sub-surface sources--of
which about 60 percent has already been developed.  Of total water use, agriculture ac-
counts for 84 percent with the rest being shared by domestic supply (5 percent) and in-
dustrial use (9 percent).  The irrigated area of 86 mha--44 mha by surface water and 42
mha by groundwater--represents 76 percent of the ultimate irrigation potential and 46 of
the area under cultivation.  About 40 percent of the developed surface water is also used
for the generation of hydro-power that represents 33 percent of total energy in India.  Al-
27though non-irrigation demand is likely to quadruple due to population growth, economic
development, and urbanization, the essentially rural and agricultural basis of Indian econ-
omy has oriented the water sector towards its irrigation segment.  However, as discussed
in the recent India Water Resources Management (WRM) sector review (World Bank-
Government of India, 1998) burgeoning demands from other sectors and rapidly devel-
oping  scarcity and water quality issues, makes comprehensive intersectoral water man-
agement, including across state boundaries, a critical need.
India has a federal form of government with a strong central government.  But, in
the water sector, both the development responsibilities and some of the legislative powers
are with the state governments.  However, the central government has some indirect lev-
erages through its role in project clearance and inter-state dispute resolution.  It also have
a direct control over major planning and technical resources and organizations such as the
Central Water  Commission, the Central Ground Water Board,  and the National  Water
Development Agency--all under the Union Ministry of Water Resources.  Nevertheless,
the lack of constitutional power makes the central government too weak to coordinate in-
stitutional issues at the state and inter-state levels, and achieving country-wide consensus
on national policies has also proven difficult.  Since legislative power, technical capabili-
ties, planning skills, and operational responsibilities are dispersed across government lay-
ers, water institutions in India remains legally weak, functionally disjoint, sectorally bi-
ased, and regionally uncoordinated.  While physical stress and financial crisis have ex-
posed the legal, policy, and administrative weakness of water sector, myopic political is-
sues and administrative resistance have impeded institutional change.
The two events that prompted a significant change in recent water policies are the
drought of 1987 and the macro economic crisis of the late 1980s. The drought led to the
first ever National  Water Policy (NWP) of 1987.  The austerity measures that followed
the economic crisis reduced water sector investment and induced irrigation departments
to look for internal resources from improved cost recovery and external resources mobi-
lized through specifically created semi-autonomous agencies (e.g., Narmada Valley De-
velopment Authority and Krishna Valley Development Corporation).  While the NWP
advocates  full cost pricing, the  1992 Committee on  Pricing Irrigation Water  suggests
higher water charges and group-based volumetric distribution of canal water  [Govern-
ment of India (GOI), 1992].  The Model Groundwater Bill that advocates, for the first
time in India, ideas like well permits, water metering, and withdrawal limits was circu-
lated in 1992.  Since irrigation departments have realized the value of farmers'  participa-
tion in water distribution, cost recovery, and system maintenance, they are beginning to
actively promote WUAs and system turn-over programs.  Despite the commitments and
efforts, the turnover process has been very slow, with the area under WUAs less than 1%
in the early 1990s.  Significant policy efforts by central and state governments have oc-
curred since then, and piloting is accelerating in states such as Orissa, Tamil Nadu  and
Rajasthan.  Most notable have been the recent initiatives by Andhra Pradesh state which
in  1997 issued a Farmers Management of Irrigation Systems Act and has subsequently
turned over management of lower systems of the entire state surface irrigation network to
some 10,300 farmers WUAs.
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ects (WRCPs),  states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,  and Orissa have  restructured
their water administration and formulated their own water policies.  The Basin-type or-
ganizations are not new to India (e.g., the Damodar Valley Corporation and various river
boards).  But, the basin organizations which are being planned in states like Tamil Nadu
are aimed not only to decentralize water administration on hydrological lines but also to
make them as stakeholder-centered tools for water allocation and conflict resolution (see
Oblitas, et al., 1996).  While Indian water sector does show significant localized progress
in key areas of water policy and water administration, the major performance challenges
and institutional issues continue to persist.
Recognition of the progressively more serious water sector issues facing India in
the new millennium  led to  a collaborative major review between the World Bank  and
Government of India of the country's water sector issues and strategy.  The review (India,
Water Resources Management, World Bank-Government of India, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c,
1998d, 1998e, 1998f) comprises five specialist reports and a  synthesis report, tackling
both the issues of intersectoral and interstate water management and the specific needs of
the major water services.  Apart from the traditional water sector concerns like cost re-
covery, system health, and use efficiency, the issues of importance from an institutional
perspectives of intersectoral and interstate issues are:
*  Enhancing the legislative power and coordination capacity of  the central government
to encourage concerted initiatives within water sector;
*  Legislating water laws based on the principle of water as an economic good, full cost
payment, and use rights essential to support market-centered approaches;
*  Formulating national, regional, and sectoral water plans as the basis for establishing
regional and sectoral water allocations or entitlements;
- Establishing  both  central, state, and basin  level mechanisms for  negotiation-based
conflict resolution and payment-based water allocation;
3  Strengthening  water  administration  both  through  a  sharper  functional  focus  and
broader disciplinary basis  as well as with  the application  of modern management
technologies;
*  Modernizing the storage and distribution systems conducive for accurate water meas-
urement and efficient delivery; and
*  Promoting  coordinated  decentralization necessary  for participatory  water resource
management within an integrated economic framework.
Since existing center-state organizations (e.g., National Water Resource Council
and National Development Council) are ineffective to promote inter-state coordination in
water resource management, it is necessary to bring water into the concurrent 2 list so that
the central government can be a vehicle for coordinated institutional changes in the water
sector.  This means a dose of centralization can be strategically useful to  advance the
cause of 'coordinated  decentralization'.  In recent years, the interest in privatization  is
also growing.  A high level committee appointed by the central government in 1994 has
2 While this concept is palatable, it probably will be difficult to include it in future reforms.
29made favorable recommendations for private sector participation (GOI, 1995). Few states
have already tried to exploit private investment directly by inviting bids for project  con-
struction and indirectly by establishing autonomous corporations for mobilizing private
funds through public bonds (Saleth, 1996:271-272). With maturing WUAs and extensive
adoption of water measuring devices, both the technical and organizational scope for the
practical application of a water rights system is increasing.  Since the key issue before the
Indian water sector is not resource development but efficient allocation and utilization,
the overall thrust of institutional reforms in India should be on an increasing reliance on
economic incentives rather than on the usual administrative mechanisms.  Given the kind
of institutional  challenges that India faces, they need to be addressed better in order to
prevent it from taking too long before the impact of these institutional changes can be felt
on water sector performance.
SELECTED  BEST PRACTICES
The best practices are important as they help in unraveling the general principles under-
lying success stories.  The best practice cases observed among the sample countries occur
in all water sub-sectors and cover all facets of water institution.  Generally, these prac-
tices are of two types, i.e., those to be  emulated within the country of occurrence and
those to be emulated beyond the country or countries of occurrence.  Besides,  some of
these practices (e.g., the basin organizations in China and Spain), though not the best un-
der present conditions, have the potential to become the best with suitable modifications
(e.g., by enhancing their autonomy and user participation).  Again, in the same case of
basin organization, we also have a whole spectrum of variations in terms of both organ-
izational basis (compare the case in Morocco with that in Australia or China and Spain)
and operational effectiveness (compare the case of Spain and China with that in Austra-
lia).  With these points in mind, some of the prominent best practice cases observed in
one or more of the sample countries can now be identified.
Mexico offers three best practices.  They are the irrigation management transfer to
WUAs, the formation of three basin organizations, and the system of water permit regis-
try.  While the second practice is worthy of replication elsewhere in the country, others
are worthy of emulation at the international level.  The most noteworthy feature of the
Mexican turn-over program is the speed with which it was implemented and the extent to
which other supportive legal and administrative changes were effected both before, dur-
ing, and after the turn-over process.  The Mexican experiment, though offers support for
the big-bang approach to turn-over, indicates the indispensability of both a high degree of
political will and farmers'  cooperation for the success of this approach.  Unlike the turn-
over program, the initiatives for basin organizations came from few provincial govern-
ments and the main inducement came from a threat of unprecedented water pollution and
depletion problems within the basins  concerned.  Since the registry of water permits,
which is maintained at all levels, keeps the record of quantified permits for both surface
and sub-surface sources, it can ensure one of the key technical requirements for the op-
eration of water markets.  But, legal changes are needed to explicitly allow change-of-use
and encourage, thereby, water transfers both within and across sectors.
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that facilitate market-based water allocation like transferable water use rightg, registry of
water rights, user-based two or three-tiered organizations (in irrigation sub-sector), and
the administratively enforced third-party protection.  The second set that supports project
viability consists of a clear demarcation of responsibility between water administration
and users, project construction being conditional on prior payment commitment from us-
ers, and the mandatory formation of user organizations up to the project level.  The third
set that improves the performance of urban water sector consists of de-bureaucratization
and privatization of urban water supply agencies, full-cost pricing with protection of poor
consumers through demand rather than supply-side subsidy, and the mandatory treatment
of urban sewerage to protect water quality.  The major problems requiring immediate so-
lutions are the deleterious 'crowding  out'  role that the power companies play in water
rights allocation, non-use of water rights mostly by power companies, and the bureau-
cratically rooted conflict resolution mechanisms.
The best practices that Brazil offers include its region and sector-specific water
strategies where regions and sectors are classified and prioritized in terms of their relative
water quantity and quality problems.  Another possible practice that needs greater articu-
lation and extension within Brazil is the program for 'water democratization'  aiming at
promoting user participation.  While the constitutional division of federal and state waters
provides a legal basis for federal-state coordination, a more effective way of achieving
this at the operational level requires both the basin level organizations like  'watershed
committees'  and inter-state mechanisms  like 'water resources councils'.  Other federal
countries with similar problems like India can learn much from Brazilian experience re-
garding what to do and what not to do in delineating the water sector responsibilities of
different government layers.
The best practices in Spain can be observed both at the macro and micro levels.
At the macro level, the most notable one is the practice of inter-regional water transfers.
Although these transfers are effected through basin-based water administration, they can
function as a potential administrative framework for market-based inter-basin water trans-
fers.  There are already cases for such economically-rooted water transfers between re-
gions.  Besides, the practice of basin level organizations making inter-sectoral allocations
within their respective jurisdictions,  though yields essentially an administrative  alloca-
tion, also qualifies for a best practice in so far this practice advances decentralized alloca-
tions.  At sub-sectoral levels is the growing practice of encouraging urban water supply
agencies  (e.g.,  Canal  Isabel  II  in  Madrid)  to  be  autonomous  and  financially  self-
dependent.  At the local level are the well known traditional community-based water allo-
cation systems operating in Valencia as well as the extensive water markets observed in
Canary Islands.  The  Valencia system,  evolved since the Arab  invasion  of  Spain,  is
known for its local level conflict resolution and an almost quantitative inter-farm water
allocation  effected without water meters.  Although technologies are complementary to
water institutions, the Valencia case where water measuring technology is being substi-
tuted by social organization suggests that there is an economically relevant margin where
institutions and technology can be substitutable.
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include both the granting of autonomy to financially self-dependent urban Wvater  supply
agencies and the privatization of urban water supply in cities like Casa Blanca.  Similarly,
the use of a revolving fund for providing loans to urban consumers for water meter in-
stallation and water appliance upgrading is also an innovative practice of making users to
self-finance conservation.  In irrigation sub-sector, the Moroccan basin organizations are
unique as some of them do not have any river system.  These organizations are essentially
project based and hence, cover both the hydrological boundaries and demand areas in-
cluding agricultural zones.  Unlike the basin organizations observed elsewhere, those in
Morocco  are managed  by the agricultural agencies and are used as the organizational
means for integrating the provision of farm inputs with water supply--an approach so cru-
cial for enhancing water productivity and farm output.  More importantly, these organi-
zations also play the role of assigning inter-sectoral water entitlements within their area
of responsibility.
Israel, being one of the most water-wise innovative countries in the world, offers a
range of best practices covering all facets of its water sector.  Israel is noted for its water
conscious users and policy-makers.  The application of water conservation technologies
and cropping systems is quite extensive leading to a high productivity of water in value
terms.  Similarly, although inter-sectoral water allocations are still based on administra-
tive means due to unavoidable socio-political reasons, water pricing is based increasingly
on sound economic rationale (e.g., full-cost pricing in urban sector and the three-part pro-
gressive tariff in irrigation sector).  Other best practice cases include the proposal for a
selective privatization  of water administration and  the unmistakable tendency  towards
water recycling and reuse.  While most of these practices are the outcome of the precari-
ous water supply regime on which the country is based, they have useful lessons for other
countries that are going to face a similar situation in future.
Most of the best practices in  South Africa are in the legal provision of the pro-
posed water law.  These provisions include the creation of a market-based water sector
and the imposition of water charges to cover not only the O&M and capital costs but also
the cost of water management, conservation, and research.  There are also few other best
practice cases that are already observed in practice.  These cases include the importance
attached to catchment management, the operation of water courts, and an extensive appli-
cation of sprinkler and drip systems in irrigation.  Besides, the Vaal River basin  with an
extensively inter-connected storage and both-way water movement facilities--somewhat a
unique water storage arrangement in the world--presents an interesting case of an engi-
neering basis for the equalization of demand and supply over time  and space.  In urban
sector, Hermanus, a coastal town of tourist importance in Western Cape, presents an in-
teresting case for the best practices observed in urban water management.  Unlike other
urban centers of South Africa, this town faces a peculiar set of problems like a finite wa-
ter supply with  no chance for supply augmentation from inter-regional water transfers,
poor quality groundwater, and an uneven seasonal pressure on demand caused by the in-
flux  of tourists  and  summer home owners.  Hermanus  tries to  solve  these  problems
32through  demand  management  techniques  that  include  a  multi-tiered  water  pricing
scheme, retro-fitting, and water education.
The most important among the best practices of Sri Lanka are its irrigation man-
agement turn-over program, the recent piloting of a share-based and farmer managed irri-
gation water company, and the cascade system of water use.  Although Sri Lankan turn-
over program is not as extensive as that in Mexico, the key feature in Sri Lanka is that the
WtUAs  are being developed as multi-purpose agencies covering not only water allocation
but also as contact points for farm input delivery including credit.  Sri Lanka is trying to
both widen the spatial coverage of its turn-over program as well as upgrade the decen-
tralization process to create commercial water companies in irrigation systems.  The re-
cent piloting of water company concept is in line with the latter aspect of management
decentralization.  The cascade system of water use, where the unused water flowing from
the upper reaches of the system is used and reused several times before the water reaches
the sea, leads to a system level physical water use efficiency of up to  80 percent.  This
system of water use--essentially an outcome of basin topography--is also relevant in other
countries  (e.g., the southern parts  of India) with  many sequentially connected surface
water bodies.
Australia, like Israel and Chile, has many best practices to offer.  The most im-
portant among them are the ones that provide the basis for a market-responsive water
economy.  These practices include the permit-based volumetric water allocation, transfer-
able permits,  and user-oriented government organizations but with effective regulatory
and coordination capabilities.  This framework is now used to achieve the target set by
the COAG for reducing water use to its 1993-94 level in the Murray-Darling basin.  The
next in line of importance is the operation of the well known inter-state water manage-
ment organization operating in the Murray-Darling River basin that regulates and coordi-
nates water allocation and water quality control. Thanks to the effectiveness of this basin
organization, this basin is now relatively free from both salinity and water sharing con-
flicts.  Another unique feature of Australian water administration is the role played by in-
dependent tribunals (e.g., Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal) in setting both
urban and rural water prices.  In urban sector, the best practices take the form of granting
autonomy to urban water supply agencies (e.g., Sydney Waters) as well as allowing pri-
vates companies in water provision  (e.g., Adelaide, Southern Australia).  On the water
quality front, Australia is having one of the best information base for quality grading and
regulatory system (based on transferable pollution permits) for controlling water quality
in its rivers and streams.
Among the best practices that China offers, the most important ones are related to
the recent institutional initiatives to liberalize its water sector.  The 1988 water law makes
a clear distinction not only between the regulatory and allocative functions of the state but
also the use rights and payment and maintenance responsibilities of users.  Although the
legal distinction between water as a resource and water as a usufruct is found in the water
laws of Chile, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, South Africa, and Spain, the Chinese law makes
such a distinction more clear and operational. This legal feature and the policy level de-
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economy made explicit in the Water Industry Policy of 1997 are the key aspects that the
water law and policy of any country need to have.  For, these aspects could help in recon-
ciling public interests with private incentives in water sector.  On the water administra-
tion side, the basin based administrative arrangement, though reels heavily under the bu-
reaucratic influence of the MOWR, can be a basis for further administrative decentraliza-
tion within water sector.  Although centralization is often considered to be inevitable in
China given its political system, provincial and local level administrations assume con-
siderable importance in flood protection and drought proofing efforts.  The administrative
arrangements for flood protection in China, evolved over time, are considered to be the
best in the world.
Although India is the only country in the sample that has not undertaken any ma-
j  or national level institutional initiatives in recent years, it does have important best prac-
tice cases as the water economy is undergoing crucial internal changes particularly at the
state and local levels.  The most important among the best practice cases observed at the
state level  are the major institutional  reforms  initiated  under the  World Bank-funded
Water Resource Consolidation Projects being implemented in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa,
and Tamil Nadu.  Other state level best practices include the formation of river valley de-
velopment corporations in Gujarat, Karnataka, and Maharashtra as independent statutory
bodies for mobilizing funds from the market as well as the rare initiative by Maharashtra
state government to solicit corporate sector participation in project construction and op-
eration.  At the micro level are the community-based Pani Panchayat (Water Council)
system and the cooperative river-based lift irrigation schemes in few areas of Maharashtra
as well as the sporadic groundwater markets in parts of Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu,  and West Bengal.  Also to be  mentioned here is the  case of an  implicit  inter-
regional  and inter-sectoral water market as water from Andhra Pradesh is transferred to
Chennai city with Tamil Nadu paying for the full project cost.
COMMON  TRENDS  AND  PATTERNS
Despite the fact that the sample countries vary in terms of their size, political system, and
development stage, they share certain commonalties in terms of their main water sector
problems and key institutional responses.  The water sector problems common to all or
most sample countries are:
*  Increasing relative water scarcity;
*  Water quality deterioration;
*  Inter-sectoral and inter-regional water allocation conflicts;
*  Poor cost recovery and operational performance;
*  Excessive government involvement and bureaucratic control; and
*  Out-of-date institutional arrangements.
While these problems are rather too obvious, their origin and inter-linkages are of
particular  importance  in  formulating both  common  and country-specific  strategies  for
water sector reform.  Water scarcity is the natural outcome in countries that have already
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rocco, and Sri Lanka).  What is notable the most is the scarcity in countries'with  excess
water potential.  In these cases, water scarcity is caused either by acute spatial demand-
supply imbalances (e.g., Australia, Brazil, and China), poor water quality (Australia, Bra-
zil, China, and South Africa), environmental constraints (e.g., Chine and India), or con-
sumptive vs. non-consumptive  conflicts due  to recreational and  in-stream needs  (e.g.,
Australia and  South Africa) and power generation demand (e.g., Chile).  In these con-
texts, water scarcity is intimately linked not only to water quality but also to inter-sectoral
and inter-regional  allocation conflicts.  Notice the three-way causative linkages among
water scarcity, water quality, and allocation conflicts.
Similar linkages between cost recovery in and operational performance of water
development schemes are easy to visualize once the intermediary variables like project
maintenance and end-result variables like service quality are traced out.  The far-reaching
effects these linkages on the financial, economic, and physical dimensions of water sector
are obvious.  What is not that obvious is the fact that these linkages have their origin in
the institutional dimension in so far as they flow from legal issues like ownership, policy
issues like water pricing, and administrative issues like investment and cost recovery ar-
rangements.  The central problem is that too much government involvement in water de-
velopment and the resultant bureaucratic control in project operation often create passive
users and rigid administrative system incapable of quickly responding to market forces.
The stagnancy  in  water sector apart,  government's  excessive  involvement  also  fritter
away the limited administrative resources in routine matters that can very well be trans-
ferred to user and other non-governmental groups.  As a result of poor allocation of its
own administrative resource and the problems in augmenting such resources from private
and  non-governmental  groups, the government  is  administratively ill-equipped  to  the
critical functions that it ought to perform in the policy and regulatory spheres.  There is,
therefore, a need for a clear demarcation of the spheres of responsibility between  gov-
ernment, user groups, and non-governmental agencies to improve functional specializa-
tion and operational coordination within water administration.
With binding physical, financial, and ecological limits to supply-side solutions,
countries trying their best, within their political economy constraints, to set right the in-
stitutional foundation of their water sector.  These efforts get reflected in terms of legal,
policy, and administrative reforms.  While water sector reforms differ across countries in
terms of their actual coverage and effectiveness, the kind of water institutional changes
currently observed at the international level are remarkable for their commonality of fo-
cus and direction.  These commonalties are:
*  Shift from development to allocation;
*  Emphasis on Decentralization and privatization;
*  Integrated approach to water management; and
*  Premium for economic viability and physical sustainability.
The paradigmatic shift from water development to water allocation cannot be ef-
fected overnight by mere policy rhetoric.  Fundamental changes are needed to reorient all
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water laws and policies, it is rather difficult to build an allocation-oriented organizational
structure out of an existing water administration with insufficient skills, built-in biases
and  archaic traditions.  Understandably,  efficient administrative  system  is  needed  to
translate the legislative provisions and policy intentions into concrete actions at the field
level.  Realignment  of existing water administration  with new  skills  and  information
techniques along with the creation of additional inter-sectoral and inter-regional organi-
zations are, therefore, critical to face the challenges of an allocation paradigm.  Unlike the
development era characterized by bureaucratic and closed-loop decision structure with a
domination of political  and engineering considerations, the allocation era demands an
open and participatory decision process with a priority for economic and ecological issues
and a premium for consensus.
Some countries (e.g., Australia, Chile, as well as regions like California and Colo-
rado in the US) already have the capability for meeting the challenges of the allocation
paradigm.  This is mainly due to their historically evolved tradition of distinguishing al-
location functions from development functions within water administration as well as the
recently developed reliance on water markets as an allocation mechanism.  Others (e.g.,
Spain and China) could develop the needed institutional potential faster whereas the re-
maining countries are to go a long way in this regard. Nevertheless, recent developments
indicate that most of the laggard countries are already trying to develop the much needed
allocation-oriented policies and mechanisms.  All sample countries either already have or
show the commitment to eventually create the necessary institutional capabilities for ush-
ering their water sector into the allocation paradigm.
Inter-sectoral allocation priorities have been established either by law  or by de-
clared policies in all countries. High level inter-sectoral and inter-ministerial mechanisms
(e.g., water resource councils) are formed to enable an integrated water sector perspective
and to resolve allocation conflicts.  Most countries either have or will have soon their na-
tional water plan useful to provide the necessary technical framework for fine-tuning in-
ter-sectoral  and  inter-regional  water  allocation patterns.  While  some  countries  (e.g.,
Australia, Israel, Mexico, and Spain) already have a national water plan, others (China,
Brazil, Morocco, South Africa, and Sri Lanka) have the mandate to develop such a plan
under their recently enacted/proposed water laws. India has tremendous technical and in-
formational capabilities to develop its national water plan.  However, the uneven disper-
sal of constitutional responsibilities and technical capabilities across government layers
found in India delays the materialization of such a water plan.
In all sample countries (except Australia, Chile, Spain, and China), inter-sectoral
water allocation mechanisms at the basin and lower levels still remain largely undevel-
oped.  Even in the case of the last two of the four countries noted above, regional mecha-
nisms  like basin  organizations, though  exist, are not  autonomous but  bureaucratically
linked to centralized state apparatus.  Decentralization of water administration is logically
linked to the paradigm shift and, therefore, needed to catalyze a faster transition to the
allocation paradigm.  The dominant tendency towards decentralization--both in the policy
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in contrast to the hypothesis of Wittfogel (1957) that increasing water scarcity is likely to
reinforce centralized state control in hydraulic societies.  All countries, even those with
tradable private water use rights  (e.g., Australia and  Chile), have asserted the overall
regulatory and allocative rights of the state.  But nowhere, even in China, is state's abso-
lute ownership of water established to  exclude private use rights.  On the contrary, all
countries have explicitly recognized private use rights and most countries (except China,
and Sri Lanka) already have or are going to have transferable water rights including pol-
lution permits.  Countries have begun  to recognize the functional distinction between
centralized mechanisms needed for coordination and enforcement and decentralized ar-
rangements needed for user participation and local level solutions.  The key feature of the
ongoing process of decentralization evident both at sectoral and sub-sectoral levels is an
increasing importance attached to:
*  River basin organizations;
*  Turn-over program  in irrigation sub-sector; and
*  Utility-type bodies in urban water sub-sector.
Almost  all  countries have  realized the  importance of basin level  organizations
both as a planning and as an allocation mechanism. These organizations are called differ-
ently in different countries (e.g., Watershed Committees in Brazil, Water  Conservancy
Commissions in China, Basin Councils in Mexico, and Hydro-geological Federations in
Spain).  They also evince notable variations in terms of their administrative arrangements
and functional autonomy (compare the Murray-Darling Basin  Commission in Australia
with the Water Conservancy Commissions in China).  Nevertheless, it is not possible to
ignore their common conceptual basis and organizational features.  Basin organizations
observed in most countries are designed mostly on hydro-geological rather than on ad-
ministrative boundaries.  This feature allow them to function as an organizational basis
for pursuing an integrated approach to water resource management as well as for resolv-
ing regional and sectoral water allocation conflicts especially in countries with a federal
form of government (e.g., Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Spain, and Sri Lanka).  While
Australia has created one of the best managed basin organizations in its Muiray-Darling
basin, countries like Spain and China have considerable experience and success with their
basin-based water administration.  But, in the latter two countries (and also in Morocco),
the basin agencies remain essentially as regional anns of concerned ministries.  Unfortu-
nately, some countries (e.g., Sri Lanka) with substantial experience with basin-based wa-
ter management have bureaucratized some of their basin level organizations by covering
them as ministries.  In all cases, however, there is a tremendous institutional potential and
also receptiveness for creating regional mechanisms for decentralized management and
stakeholders participation.
Considering the nature of decentralization at sub-sectoral levels, the main mode of
decentralization in irrigation sector is IMT under which the managerial responsibilities
including  cost  recovery  and  system maintenance  are transferred  to  legally  registered
WUAs.  The involvement of users in local level irrigation management is quite extensive
in Mexico, Chile, Spain, and Sri Lanka (as well as in Turkey and Philippines) and it is
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stan.  While China has a tradition of community involvement in lower level irrigation
management  (especially through labor contribution for system maintenance), both Aus-
tralia as well as the western parts of US have arrangements such as irrigation districts
wherein farmers have far greater managerial and financial responsibilities.  In Sri Lanka,
the turn-over program has evolved into a higher stage with the piloting of a share-based
and farmer-managed water company in 1997.  In Spain, the current proposal to make ba-
sin organizations more autonomous and financially self-dependent is likely to  advance
decentralization still further.
Decentralization in the urban water sector occurs in the form of creating autono-
mous and financially self-dependent utility-type organizations for the provision of urban
water services.  Instances for such companies can be found in all countries except India,
Sri Lanka, and China.  Although there are no such utilities in China at present, the 1997
Water Industry Policy aims to create them in the near future.  Meanwhile, in countries
like Australia, Chile, Spain and Morocco, urban water supply agencies, though still re-
main publicly owned, are allowed to operate on commercial lines with almost full auton-
omy.  In Morocco (and also in Philippines and Argentina), urban water sector decentrali-
zation have often taken the form of privatization as the water supply functions are cur-
rently performed by private (foreign-owned) water companies.
Privatization is linked to urban water sector decentralization just like user partici-
pation is linked to decentralization in irrigation sector.  However, privatization and user
participation can transcend sectoral boundaries given the role of private sector in water
sector financing and technology development as well as the necessity of user participation
in water planning and allocation.  The effectiveness of basin and project level organiza-
tions depends on an active participation of users as major stakeholders.  While privatiza-
tion and decentralization are obviously in an advanced stage in countries with a relatively
advanced  and  privatized  water sector like Australia  and  Chile, even countries  with  a
highly bureaucratized water sector like China and India are now actively exploring the
ways to tap private financial, managerial, and technical resources.  While all countries are
actively promoting user organizations as an indispensable ally for improving their water
sector performance, only a few countries (e.g., Australia and Chile) have developed the
incentive structures (e.g., water entitlements) and the institutional mechanisms  (e.g., ba-
sin or project level organizations) essential for sustaining user participation.
While the paradigmatic change in water sector logically leads to decentralization,
the latter opens the door for privatization and user participation.  The sequential linkages
among these aspects on the one hand and the critical linkages that water scarcity has with
water quality in particular and environment in general on the other hand call for an inte-
grated approach to water resources management.  Since such an approach recognizes well
the inter-linkages among water sector problems, it can exploit fully the inter-linkages and
synergy among institutional aspects.  All countries have recognized the critical linkages
between financial health and physical performance of water sector and the indispensable
role of such linkages in sustaining user participation and privatization.  As the Mexican
38and Sri Lankan experiences have shown, participation has succeeded mostly in areas with
modernized irrigation schemes.  There is unanimity among countries that a phased  im-
provement in cost recovery is the key first step to salvage the water sector from financial
crisis and physical degeneration.  Although full recovery of O&M costs is the stated ob-
jective in all countries, countries like Australia and Chile have gone a step ahead of others
by trying at an annuity-based capital cost recovery.  Notably, South Africa is attempting
to recover also the costs involved in water conservation, management, and research.  But,
the basic problem still remains as no country including Australia, Chile, and Israel has
eliminated the water sector subsidies completely.
Although the physical health of water distribution and drainage infrastructures af-
fects water quality, the most serious factors damaging water quality are: industrial pollu-
tion, urban sewerage, and agricultural chemicals and pesticides.  The common approach
to deal with water quality involves water quality grading, quality standards, and pollution
control regulations.  All the sample countries grade their water in terms of quality catego-
rization  defined  by  chemical properties  and  usability  of water.  Although  almost  all
countries have provisions for pollution permit systems, they differ in terms of its effective
implementation and monitoring.  Some countries (e.g., Australia and Israel) have very
strict implementation of quality standards, others lack the necessary institutional mecha-
nisms and political will to make much headway on the water pollution front.  But, policy
level awareness of water quality problems and their health and environmental effects are
evident in all countries which often manifest in moving water to environment or natural
resources ministries.  Countries like Australia have water within the overall portfolio of
natural resources from the start.  But, others (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and Morocco)
have only recently moved water matters to the environment ministry.  Another adminis-
trative manifestation  is the effort to bring together most of the water-related functions
within  one  organization  (e.g., Indian  states such as  Tamil Nadu  and  Orissa).  These
changes, though  inadequate, aim, however,  to  correct sub-sectoral biases  within water
sector and inculcate broad sector-wide perspective necessary for an integrated approach
to water management.  Another change quite positive from the viewpoint of integrated
approach  is  the  incorporation  of  catchment  management  considerations  within  basin
management plans.  Such a change, though more significant in China, South Africa, and
Sri Lanka, is, nevertheless, visible in all sample countries.
Finally, it is important to recognize the key forces that have motivated both the
observed  and  ongoing  water  sector reform  initiatives.  In  this  respect,  distinction  is
needed between the fundamental factors and the proximate factors of institutional change.
While the water sector crisis remained the dominant fundamental factor, the proximate or
immediate factors for change came from elsewhere in the economy.  In all countries ex-
cept those  with matured water economies (Israel and Australia), the immediate context
for reforms was provided by changes outside the water economy.  For instance, macro
economic crisis of the late 1980s remained as the main motive force not only for an ex-
tensive turn-over program of Mexico but also for the ongoing debates on water sector re-
form in India, Australia, and Chile.  In South Africa, water sector reform forms part of the
program for reconstructing a broad-based democratic system out of an erstwhile apartheid
39system.  In Spain, the water sector reforms form part of the country's  transition  from a
controlled system to a liberalized one and its subsequent obligations as an EC member.
In Sri Lanka, international lending agencies (e.g., World Bank and Asian Development
Bank) and technical/donor organizations (e.g., IIMI and FAO) have played a facilitating
role for institutional change.  In Chile, China, and Brazil, on the other hand, water sector
reforms have benefited from the synergetic influences of political and economic liberali-
zation policies.  This means that water sector reforms and institutional changes observed
in these three countries forms an integral part of an economy-wide liberalization program.
The reform process in  all countries-both  within and outside our sample--has also re-
ceived  impetus  from  an  increasing  international  awareness  on  environmental
sustainability.
CONCLUSIONS AND  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
The cross-country  evaluation of  water sector problems and  institutional  responses at-
tempted here shows rather clearly that the dominant water sector concerns revolve no
longer around water development and  water quantity  but  around water allocation  and
water quality.  With a shifting nature of water problems, the development paradigm un-
derlying current water institutions is also undergoing irreversible changes.  These changes
include an increasing recognition of the indispensable role that decentralized allocation
mechanisms can play in enhancing the influence of economic forces and the participation
of stakeholders in water sector decisions.  As the notion of water provision as a public
good and welfare activity is giving way for the concept of water as an economic good and
input in economic activity, cost recovery and financial viability concerns are getting in-
creasingly reflected at the policy level.
While there is a clear policy commitment in all countries to amend past policies
and existing institutional structures that caused the present water sector crisis, countries
are  obviously  at  different  stages  in  actual  water  sector  reform  through  institutional
change.  The comparative evaluation allows a tentative placement of countries within the
spectrum of institutional capability in the water sector. Countries like Australia and Chile
(as well as states like California and  Colorado in the US) have reached  an advanced,
though not yet in an ideal, stage of institutional evolution.  Israel, with its technologically
advanced water sector, could very well be ahead of these countries when the proposal to
allow water transfers  and decentralize  its water development and distribution  systems
takes a practical shape.  While Mexico and Sri Lanka have made substantial progress in
reforming their irrigation sub-sector, they are yet to make a comprehensive and sector-
wide institutional reform.  Among these two, Mexico is ahead in terms of the required in-
stitutional potential for a comprehensive water sector reform.
Spain, followed by China, also has the organizational potential as well as the wa-
ter law and water sector reformn  proposals to decentralize its basin organizations and in-
troduce market solutions which could actually strengthen the institutional foundation of
its water sector.  Although its partial success in reforming urban water sector and scar-
city-induced openness for change place Morocco favorably for an eventual sector-wide
40institutional  reform,  the political  weight of food and employment  considerations  can still
stifle progress in its irrigation  sub-sector. Brazil, though shows considerable  political
commitment  followed by concrete actions in the form of water law enactment  and ad-
ministrative  reorganization,  is constrained,  however, by the present constitutional  divi-
sion of water sector responsibilities  between the federal and state governments. To cir-
cumvent this constraint,  Brazil needs to strengthen and develop inter-state  and federal-
state organizational  mechanisms  to  drive towards coordinated  actions in water sector.
Although  India, with problems  similar  to Brazil, remains at the bottom within the spec-
trum of water sector reform  at the national level, notable progress  is observed,  however,
at the level of few states like Andhra  Pradesh,  Orissa,  and Tamil  Nadu.
The analytical  evaluation  of water challenge  and institutional  change,  though per-
formed  with a cross-country  comparison  of a small set of countries  and based on obser-
vational evidences,  does have notable implications  both for the literature  on institutional
economics  as well as for the policy  of promoting  institutional  change  within water sector.
Some of the major implications,  which can provide  policy inputs and operational  guid-
ance to both national governments  and international  lending/development  agencies like
the World Bank, can be summarized  as follows:
First, as to the overall thrust of water sector reform strategy,  the intimate multi-
dimensional  linkages among key water sector problems  suggest two crucial policy tips.
Although isolated  attempts  in one dimension  will certainly  influence  other dimensions  as
well, an integrated  approach  will have the maximum  effects through  the phenomenon  of
inter-dimensional  synergy. At the heart of such an integrated approach  lie institutional
changes  that aim to modernize  and strengthen  the existing legal, policy, and administra-
tive arrangements  governing  water sector as a whole.
Second,  the mere fact that institutional  changes  are actually occurring  in all sam-
ple countries  can be taken as an indirect  and informal  observational  evidence  for the fact
that the opportunity costs (i.e., the potential net gains) of institutional change are in-
creasing to surpass the corresponding  transaction costs in most contexts. But, the fact
that institutional  changes are uniform neither across  institutional  components  nor across
water sub-sectors  suggests  that both the opportunity  and transaction  costs vary by con-
text.  This explains why countries  like India find it easier to have a water policy than a
water law or countries  like Morocco find it easier to initiate reform in the urban sector
than in the irrigation  sector.
Third, the variations  in both the extent and coverage  of institutional  reform  across
countries  also provide  evidence  for the influence  that forces outside  the water sector have
on both the opportunity and transaction costs of institutional  change within the water
sector. While the ongoing  democratic  reconstruction  reduces  the overall transaction  cost
of water sector reform  in South Africa,  the general process  of economic  and political lib-
eralization  reduces  the same  in China. These  two recent cases as well as the earlier cases
of Chile (in the early 1970s)  and Spain (in the 1980s)  also suggests  the presence of con-
siderable scale economies  in the transaction  cost of institutional  change. In Mexico and
41also, to some extent, in India, the overall fiscal discipline induced by macro economic re-
forms played an important role in magnifying the opportunity cost of instituti'onal change
within water sector.  Since EC plays a strong role in Spanish water sector reforms through
its farm product restriction policies, water quality directives, and environmental regula-
tions, the transaction and opportunity costs of institutional change in Spain also acquire a
trans-national dimension.  In contrast to these cases, national security considerations form
an important part of the transaction costs of water sector reform in Israel.
Fourth, the experience of Australia and Chile provides some evidence for the fact
that the earlier institutional changes tend to reduce the transaction costs of subsequent in-
stitutional changes.  This suggests that in countries with only partial reforms at present,
fuirther  institutional reforms can advance fairly at a faster pace, that too, with lesser finan-
cial costs and political opposition.  This is because the earlier reforms could not only re-
duce the transaction costs of subsequent reforms but also realign political balance by cre-
ating a strong pro-reform constituency.  The operational linkages between each subse-
quent reform phases/components and their transaction costs have considerable value in
relaxing the political  economy constraints and minimizing the overall costs of  institu-
tional change. Notice that transaction cost declines and political balance improves as one
moves on the spectrum of institutional change due to the positive effects of scale econo-
mies and strong pro-reform constituency.  It is, therefore, prudent from a political econ-
omy viewpoint to proceed on a logically linked sequence of reforms wherein sub-sectors
and institutional components are taken one at a time within a prioritized scheme.
Fifth, from the viewpoint of international lending/development agencies like the
World Bank, their current emphasis on both the formulation of water policy and water
law as well as the reorganization of water administration in their member countries needs
to  continue.  But, there is a critical need now to  concentrate their funds and efforts  in
countries, areas, and  sub-sectors already with  a  critical mass  of institutional  build-up.
Since the probability of success in these cases is more than in others due to a relatively
lower transaction cost, the overall economic return on their capacity building investments
will not only be maximized but will also be quick.  Quick economic return and faster re-
payment can allow a faster recycling and reinvestment of resources in the capacity build-
ing portfolio of international lending/development agencies.
Sixth, both the transaction and opportunity costs of institutional changes in the
water sector are strongly influenced also by forces external to the strict confines of water
sector (e.g., political  reforms, economic liberalization, multi-lateral agreements, and in-
ternational trade).  It is, therefore, crucial to strategically exploit the political economy
context provided by these forces so as to gain momentum for an accelerated reform in the
realm of water institutions.
And, finally,  so as to promote concerted policies  and programs for institutional
change especially at the international level, cross-country-based policy studies have con-
siderable value in sharpening the overall understanding of the mechanics of institutional
change and their ultimate impact on water sector performance.  There is a particular need
42for research studies  which are able to trace and quantitatively  evaluate  not only the multi-
dimensional  linkages among various components  of water institutions  but also the way
their influences  are channeled  through  various  institutional  layers and get finally  reflected
in water sector performance. Such a quantitative  evaluation  of issues operating  in the in-
ter-face  between  institutional  change  and water sector  performance  can provide  a credible
basis for deriving both generic and country-specific  strategies for institutional  changes
within water sector.  While there cannot be an unique prescription for institutional
changes applicable  everywhere,  the blue print of an ideal water institution  derived from
cross-country  experience,  could serve as the initial framework  to iteratively  plan both na-
tional and global initiatives in  the realm of water institutions.  International lend-
ing/development  agencies  like the World Bank, with its declared  commitment  for capac-
ity building,  have a clear stake  in promoting  policy studies  of the kind needed  now.
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